





The Role of Information Asymmetry and the Level of Market 
Trading Activity in Shaping the Time-to-Maturity Pattern of 









Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), School of 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ i 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................. vi 
SYNOPSIS................................................................................................................ vii 
DECLARATION .................................................................................................... viii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................... ix 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 
 
2.  THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY ON THE VOLATILITY 
PATTERN ................................................................................................................ 13 
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 14 
2.2. Related literature ........................................................................................ 19 
2.3. Data and methods ..................................................................................... 244 
2.4. Empirical results ...................................................................................... 322 
2.4.1. The time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry ............................ 322 
2.4.2. The impact of information asymmetry on futures return volatility ............. 377 
2.4.3. The speculative effect and the price elasticity effect .................................... 40 
2.5. An illustrative model of return volatility when uninformed liquidity hedgers 
are unaware of their informational disadvantage ....................................... 455 
2.6. Robustness tests ....................................................................................... 499 




3.  THE LEVEL OF FUTURES MARKET ACTIVITY AND THE SENSITIVITY 
PATTERN .............................................................................................................. 644 
3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................. 655 
3.2. Data and method ........................................................................................ 70 
3.3. Empirical results ...................................................................................... 744 
3.3.1. The time-to-maturity pattern of trading volume and open interest .............. 744 
3.3.2. The sensitivity pattern ............................................................................... 777 
3.3.3. Peak-to-maturity ....................................................................................... 833 
3.3.4. The tilt of the sensitivity pattern and its impact on the linear test for the volatility 
pattern ...................................................................................................... 866 
3.3.5. Practical implications ................................................................................ 899 
3.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................... 933 
 
4. CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND POTENTIAL FUTURE 
RESEARCH  .......................................................................................................... 944 
4.1. Contributions and practical implications ................................................... 955 
4.2. Limitations and potential future research .................................................. 988 
 









LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1:  Descriptive statistics............ ................................................................ 28 
Table 2.2:  Univariate tests of the relationship between information asymmetry and 
time-to-maturity .................................................................................. 33 
Table 2.3:  Testing the time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry without 
controlling for seasonality and liquidity. .............................................. 35 
Table 2.4:  Testing the time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry with 
controlling for seasonality and liquidity. .............................................. 36 
Table 2.5: Testing the impact of information asymmetry and  time-to-maturity on 
return  volatility ................................................................................... 38 
Table 2.6:  The speculative effect and the price elasticity effect ............................ 41 
Table 2.7:  Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return 
volatility – time-to-maturity relationship when controlling for 
autocorrelation in return volatility  ...................................................... 50 
Table 2.8:  Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return 
volatility – time-to-maturity relationship using Huang and Stoll’s (1997) 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread .............................. 54 
Table 2.9:  Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return 
volatility – time-to-maturity relationship using the Madhavan, Richardson 
and Rooman’s (1997) information asymmetry component measured as 
percentage of the bid-ask spread .......................................................... 56 
iv 
 
Table 2.10: Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return 
volatility – time-to-maturity relationship during the 2007-2009 crisis 
period .................................................................................................. 59 
Table 2.11: Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return 
volatility – time-to-maturity relationship after the 2007-2009 crisis period
 ............................................................................................................ 61 
Table 3.1:  Summary statistics .............................................................................. 72 
Table 3.2: Testing the time-to-maturity pattern of trading volume and open 
interest ................................................................................................ 75 
Table 3.3: Univariate test for the change in SENSITIVITY over the futures contract 
life ...................................................................................................... 78 
Table 3.4: Testing the sensitivity pattern .............................................................. 80 
Table 3.5:   Testing the sensitivity pattern using only news headlines containing the 
name of the commodity ....................................................................... 82 
Table 3.6:   Analysing the shape of the time-to-maturity pattern of trading volume, 
open interest and SENSITIVITY. ........................................................ 84 
Table 3.7:   Testing the linear volatility pattern ...................................................... 88 
Table 3.8:   Comparing the volatility of the closest-to-peak and the closest-to-maturity 
futures price series............................................................................... 92 
Appendix Table 1:   Specifications of commodity futures contracts.......................... 104 
Appendix Table 2:   Historical maintenance margin during the period 2003-2016 .... 105 
v 
 
Appendix Table 3:   Testing the sensitivity pattern using ten-minute realized 
volatility................................................................................... 111 
Appendix Table 4:   Testing the sensitivity pattern using the natural logarithm of the 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1:   Hong’s proposal of the time-to-maturity pattern of information 
asymmetry, the speculative effect (Samuelson effect), the price elasticity 
effect, and the overall effect .................................................................. 5 
Figure 1.2:  Average trading volume and open interest over the contract life for 
September wheat futures contracts traded during the period 2003-
2016 ..........................................................................................................7 
Figure 2.1:    The mediation framework to separate the speculative effect and the price 
elasticity effect .................................................................................... 30 
Figure 2.2:  The impact of the speculative effect on the time-to-maturity pattern of 
return  volatility ................................................................................... 43 










I consider two explanations for the mixed empirical results on the Samuelson effect, 
which postulates that futures return volatility increases closer to maturity when the 
futures price becomes more sensitive to information flows. First, I empirically investigate 
Hong’s (2000) theoretical suggestion that information asymmetry has an impact on the 
time-to-maturity pattern of commodity futures return volatility (the “volatility pattern”) 
by testing the relationships information asymmetry has with the time-to-maturity and 
return volatility of commodity futures. I find that information asymmetry rises as 
commodity futures near maturity and that this increases return volatility. Thus, this 
“speculative effect” amplifies return volatility and can potentially be a more significant 
driver of the volatility pattern than Samuelson’s (1965) price elasticity effect.  
Second, I directly examine the time-to-maturity pattern of the sensitivity of futures return 
volatility to information flows (the “sensitivity pattern”) and find that it has an inverted 
U-shape. I point out that the results for tests of a linear volatility pattern are more 
significant when the inverted U-shape of the sensitivity pattern tilts more towards 
maturity. As an example of the practical implication of my findings, I show that a futures 
price series constructed based on contracts that are closest to the peak of the sensitivity 
pattern captures higher volatility (9.98% in-sample and 2.63% out-of-sample) than the 
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One of the well-known issues in the literature that examines futures markets is the 
relationship between the return volatility and the time-to-maturity of a futures contract. 
Samuelson (1965) is the first to propose that futures return volatility should increase 
closer to maturity (the Samuelson effect). The logic behind this is that the closer a futures 
contract is to maturity, the more sensitive the price is to information regarding its 
fundamental value. Evidence for the Samuelson effect is, however, mixed across 
commodities and over time. For example, Rutledge (1976) finds the Samuelson effect is 
present for silver and cocoa futures, but not for wheat and soybean oil. Milonas (1986) 
shows the presence of the Samuelson effect in several commodities futures, but not corn. 
Bessembinder et al. (1996) document the effect for agricultural futures, crude oil and, to 
a certain extent, metals. Duong and Kalev (2008) find similar results for agricultural 
futures but not for crude oil and gold.  
Much research has been devoted to investigating the Samuelson effect because the 
futures return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship has important practical 
implications. Specifically, this relationship is essential for forming trading strategies, 
setting margins and pricing options (Board and Sutcliffe, 1990; Chen et al., 1999; Duong 
and Kalev, 2008). First, the margin required for trading futures is positively related to 
return volatility, which represents risk. If the Samuelson effect holds, the margin should 
be raised as the futures contract nears maturity. Second, if return volatility increases 
closer to maturity, hedgers might want to switch to contracts further from maturity to 
minimize volatility, since higher volatility entails higher risk premiums (a higher margin 
is one example). On the other hand, speculators would prefer contracts closer to maturity 
because higher return volatility can allow them to earn higher short-term profits. Finally, 
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options are priced based on the volatility of the underlying asset. Whether the relationship 
between return volatility and time-to-maturity is negative or positive should lead to a rise 
or fall in the price of options on the futures contract as maturity approaches. 
The contribution I make in this thesis to the extant literature is that I consider two possible 
explanations for the previously mixed results on the Samuelson effect (See, among 
others, Rutledge, 1976; Anderson, 1985; Milonas, 1986; Khoury and Yourougou, 1993; 
Bessembinder et al., 1996; Galloway and Kolb, 1996; Allen and Cruickshank, 2000; and 
Duong and Kalev, 2008). First, return volatility arises from the trading activities of 
investors, whose motivation to trade will be based on the information set they have at 
hand. This information set is neither likely to be homogenous across all investors nor 
fixed over the life of the futures contract. However, prior models that attempt to explain 
the relationship between return volatility and time-to-maturity generally assume 
investors are symmetrically informed (Samuelson, 1965; Anderson and Danthine, 1983; 
Bessembinder et al., 1996). The exception is Hong (2000), whose model posits that 
information asymmetry between investors will be related to time-to-maturity and that 
this will have a bearing on return volatility. Hong’s (2000) model conjectures that the 
time-to-maturity pattern of futures return volatility is not only shaped by the Samuelson 
effect (the author coins this the “price elasticity effect”), but also by another effect 
arising from the presence of information asymmetry in the market (the author coins this 
the “speculative effect”). This speculative effect results from two important predictions 
by the model. First, information asymmetry increases closer to maturity. Second, 
information asymmetry reduces return volatility. Consequently, the speculative effect is 
expected to have a negative impact on return volatility as the futures contract expires, 
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countering the price elasticity effect (See Figure 1.1 for an illustration)1. Hong (2000) 
suggests that the interaction of the two opposite effects provide a possible explanation 
for the mixed empirical evidence on the Samuelson effect in previous research. I 
empirically test Hong’s (2000) predictions by examining the impact information 
asymmetry has on the time-to-maturity pattern of futures return volatility. 
 
                                                             
1 A detailed review of the model is provided in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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Figure 1.1: Hong’s proposal of the time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry, the speculative effect (Samuelson 
effect), the price elasticity effect, and the overall effect. 
 
 
This figure illustrates Hong’s (2000) predictions of (I): the time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry, and (II): the time-to-
maturity pattern of return volatility (the overall effect), shaped by the price elasticity effect (Samuelson effect) and the speculative 
effect. Hong (2000) suggests that information asymmetry increases as maturity nears. As he anticipates a negative impact of information 
asymmetry on return volatility, he predicts that the speculative effect has a negative impact on the upward pattern of return volatility, 













































Second, prior studies focus on the time-to-maturity pattern of futures return volatility 
(hereafter the “volatility pattern”) rather than the pattern of the sensitivity of futures 
return volatility to information flows (hereafter the “sensitivity pattern”). However, the 
Samuelson effect has the underlying assumption that the sensitivity pattern 
monotonically rises as the contract nears maturity, leading to a similar volatility pattern. 
This may not be true. In fact, it is more likely that the sensitivity pattern will vary, and 
be dependent upon, the time-to-maturity pattern of the level of market activity for the 
contract (see Kyle, 1983; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993). 
In addition, as Anderson and Danthine (1983) highlight, information is not likely to flow 
uniformly into the market during the life of the futures contract, further leading to 
changes in the volatility pattern. I hypothesize that the sensitivity pattern will be a 
quadratic function of time-to-maturity since the market activity of commodity futures 
contracts generally follows an inverted U-shape pattern (Commodity Exchange 
Authority, 1960; Powers, 1967; Working, 1970; Leuthold, 1983). As an illustration, 
Figure 1.2 shows the average trading volume and open interest over the life of September 
wheat futures contracts traded between 2003 and 2016. Both the levels of trading volume 
and open interest display an inverted U-shape pattern. I empirically test the sensitivity 
pattern and also investigate how it affects the result of the test for the linear volatility 
pattern. Specifically, I conjecture that we are more likely to find stronger (weaker) 
evidence that volatility increases closer to the maturity date if the inverted U-shape of 






Figure 1.2: Average trading volume and open interest over the contract life for September wheat 




To examine these issues I start, in Chapter 2 of my thesis, to show and interpret the results 
from empirical tests of Hong’s (2000) prediction on the influence of information 
asymmetry on the Samuelson effect. To do this I use the twelve most liquid commodity 
futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange group of exchanges (CME Group 
hereafter), including the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT), the Commodity Exchange (COMEX), and the New York Mercantile 
Exchange (NYMEX). My data covers an 11-year period from 2006 to 2016. Intraday 
trading ticks and quotes are collected from Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH). I use 
Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans’ (1997) estimate of the information asymmetry 


























asymmetric information2. In examining the relationship this measure has with time-to-
maturity, I find that for all futures in the sample, information asymmetry significantly 
rises closer to maturity. This is consistent with Hong’s (2000) prediction.  
I then proceed to investigate the impact information asymmetry has on return volatility, 
which I capture through daily realized volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998). Hong’s 
(2000) prediction of a negative impact is based on the assumption that uninformed 
hedgers choose to trade less when facing higher information asymmetry. In reality, 
however, uninformed hedgers may not have the capability or motivation to learn about 
their informational disadvantage. As a result, we should expect information asymmetry 
to instead have a positive impact on return volatility (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; 
Shalen, 1993; Daigler and Wiley, 1999). My empirical results support this expectation 
and show a strong, positive impact of information asymmetry on return volatility across 
the twelve futures. My calculation of the speculative and price elasticity effects using a 
mediation analysis (Judd and Kenny, 1981; Sobel, 1982; Baron and Kenny, 1986) shows 
that for all futures, the speculative effect significantly raises return volatility as maturity 
nears instead of dampening it as suggested by Hong (2000). I only find evidence for the 
price elasticity effect in five of the futures. The result indicates that information 
asymmetry in fact plays an important role in driving the volatility pattern.  
In Chapter 3 I turn my attention to investigating my second hypothesis that the sensitivity 
pattern is a quadratic function of time-to-maturity. This should be the case as I show that 
the level of market activity (open interest and trading volume) follows an inverted U-
shape over the life of the futures contract. To directly test the sensitivity pattern, I utilize 
                                                             
2 To reliably estimate the daily MRR measure, a sufficient number of trades and quotes are required. This 
is the reason why I only include the most liquid futures and only consider the period from 2006 onwards, 
when the data contains an adequate level of daily trades and quotes.  
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the Thompson Reuters News Analytics (TRNA) database, which provides 
comprehensive data on daily commodity news coverage. I measure information flows by 
the number of daily news items about the commodity, extracted from TRNA. I calculate 
SENSITIVITY, a measure of the sensitivity of futures return volatility to information 
flows, as the ratio of return volatility to the number of daily news items. The sample for 
this empirical test include all contracts traded between January 1st, 2003 and June 30th, 
2014 for twelve commodity futures on the CME Group. These include agricultural 
(grains, oilseeds, and livestock), metals and energy futures. 
Both my univariate and multivariate tests support the hypothesis that the sensitivity 
pattern has an inverted U-shape. To analyse the pattern, I calculate the peak-to-maturity 
(PTM) for each futures contract. That is the number of days between when the peak of 
the sensitivity pattern being reached and the maturity date of the contract, measured as 
the percentage of the contract’s life. A smaller PTM indicates that SENSITIVITY peaks 
later in the life of the contract, and vice versa. This implies that a smaller PTM will more 
likely lead to the test for the negative relationship between return volatility and time-to-
maturity having stronger result, if one is searching for a linear volatility pattern. My 
analysis shows that PTM is relatively smaller for agricultural and energy futures and but 
relatively higher for metals futures. As expected, the regression results for a linear 
volatility pattern show a significant and negative relationship between return volatility 
and time-to-maturity for energy and agricultural futures, but not for metals. As part of 
my analysis, I also show that the variation in the tilt of the sensitivity pattern across 
futures could be attributed to the difference in the relationship between trading volume 
and open interest across futures. 
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In Chapter 4 of this thesis I discuss the contributions I make to the extant literature, as 
well as the limitations of this study and directions for potential future research. This 
study’s first set of results, presented in Chapter 2, indicates that the presence of 
information asymmetry in the futures markets strengthens the Samuelson effect. To the 
best of my knowledge, this study is the first to empirically test Hong’s (2000) theoretical 
model which claims that time-varying information asymmetry plays a key role in the 
relationship between futures return volatility and time-to-maturity. I contribute to the 
futures market literature by showing a significant and positive impact of information 
asymmetry, through the speculative effect, on the upward slope of futures return 
volatility as a contract approaches maturity. I find it is more consistent, in terms of its 
direction and impact, than the price elasticity effect. My findings can potentially explain 
why there is such inconsistency in the empirical evidence of previous studies (Rutledge, 
1976; Anderson, 1985; Milonas, 1986; Khoury and Yourougou, 1993; Bessembinder et 
al., 1996; Galloway and Kolb, 1996; Allen and Cruickshank, 2000; and Duong and 
Kalev, 2008) as they do not account for the mediating impact time-varying information 
asymmetry has on the time-to-maturity pattern of return volatility. This study is also the 
first to provide empirical evidence that information asymmetry rises as a futures contract 
nears its maturity, supporting Hong’s (2000) first hypothesis. I also contribute to the 
literature that looks at the relationship between information asymmetry and return 
volatility (see Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Shalen, 1993; and Daigler and Wiley, 1999) 
by showing that information asymmetry has a positive impact on futures return volatility. 
My findings support the premise that uninformed investors may not recognize their 
informational disadvantage in order to react rationally.  
The second set of results of this study, presented in Chapter 3, reveals an inverted U-
shape sensitivity pattern. It also shows that the result of the test for a linear volatility 
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pattern depends on the tilt of the sensitivity pattern towards the maturity of the futures 
contract. My analysis contributes to the extant literature in a number of ways. First, to 
the best of my knowledge, this work is the first to directly examine the sensitivity pattern. 
The tilt towards maturity of the inverted U-shape pattern provides an additional 
explanation for the mixed empirical results on the linear volatility pattern (Rutledge, 
1976; Anderson, 1985; Milonas, 1986; Khoury and Yourougou, 1993; Bessembinder et 
al., 1996; Galloway and Kolb, 1996; Allen and Cruickshank, 2000; and Duong and 
Kalev, 2008). Second, the results further substantiate previous studies that suggest an 
inverted U-shape pattern of the level of futures market activity (Commodity Exchange 
Authority, 1960; Powers, 1967; Working, 1970; Leuthold, 1983), which influences the 
sensitivity of return volatility to information (Kyle, 1983; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; 
Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993). My findings have an important practical implication. 
An inverted U-shape sensitivity pattern means that futures prices are more sensitive to 
information near the peak of the pattern. Thus, market participants should use the 
distance-to-peak as a better predictor of futures return volatility than the commonly used 
distance-to-maturity. I show that the closest-to-peak futures price series, constructed by 
rolling contracts that are closest to the peak of the sensitivity pattern, captures higher 
average annualized volatility by 9.98% in-sample and 2.63% out-of-sample, than the 
often used closest-to-maturity series. Using the average maintenance margin (which is 
determined based on the level of volatility in the market) required to trade the futures in 
my sample as a proxy for the price of volatility, this amounts to $7,169 (in-sample) and 
$2,935 (out-of-sample) for an open position of 1000 contracts. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses my analysis on the mediating 
role of information asymmetry in the return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship. In 
Chapter 3, I investigate the quadratic sensitivity pattern and how it influences the result 
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of the test for a linear volatility pattern. In Chapter 4, I discuss my contributions to the 
literature, as well as the limitations of this study and potential future research. I conclude 













THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION 






  “…but there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we do not know we don't 
know.” 
- Donald Rumsfeld, former US Secretary of Defence, 2002 
 




In this chapter, I examine whether the presence of information asymmetry in the futures 
market influences the time-to-maturity pattern of futures return volatility. Return 
volatility arises from the trading activities of investors, whose motivation to trade will be 
based on the information set they have at hand. This information set is neither likely to 
be homogenous across all investors nor fixed over the life of the futures contract. 
However, prior models that attempt to explain the relationship between return volatility 
and time-to-maturity generally assume investors are symmetrically informed 
(Samuelson, 1965; Anderson and Danthine, 1983; Bessembinder et al., 1996). The only 
exception is Hong (2000), whose model posits that information asymmetry between 
investors will be related to time-to-maturity and that this relationship will have a bearing 
on return volatility. I empirically test Hong’s (2000) predictions by examining how 
information asymmetry changes over the maturity of futures contracts, and how these 
changes in information asymmetry affect the time-to-maturity pattern of futures return 
volatility. Consistent with Hong’s (2000) predictions, my results confirm the central role 
played by time-varying information asymmetry (i.e., the speculative effect). However, I 
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find that the speculative effect has a positive impact on the upward time-to-maturity 
pattern of futures return volatility instead of a negative one suggested by Hong (2000).  
Hong’s (2000) model conjectures that the time-to-maturity pattern of futures return 
volatility is not only shaped by the Samuelson effect (i.e., the price elasticity effect), but 
also by another effect arising from the presence of information asymmetry in the market 
(i.e., the speculative effect). This speculative effect results from two underlying 
hypotheses in Hong’s (2000) model regarding the relationship that information 
asymmetry has with both time-to-maturity and return volatility. Hong’s (2000) first 
hypothesis (H1) is that information asymmetry increases as the futures contract 
approaches its maturity, and his second hypothesis (H2) is that increases in information 
asymmetry lead to reductions in return volatility. Consequently, the speculative effect is 
expected to have a negative impact on return volatility as the futures contract approaches 
expiration, thus offsetting the price elasticity effect proposed by Samuelson. Hong (2000) 
suggests that the interaction of these two opposing forces provides a possible explanation 
for the mixed empirical evidence for the Samuelson effect in previous research. 
The logic behind Hong’s (2000) hypotheses is as follow. The model proposes two types 
of investors in the market: perfectly informed speculators and uninformed hedgers. 
Hedgers trade futures contracts for the sole purpose of hedging their spot positions. In 
contrast, speculators trade futures contracts for two purposes – to speculate in the market 
at hand using their private information about the underlying asset’s fundamental value 
and to hedge their positions in other markets (i.e., nonmarketed/noise risk). As maturity 
nears, the futures price becomes more sensitive to the fundamental (hence, the price 
elasticity effect) and also to noise risk. In the general case where shocks to the 
fundamental are more persistent than noise shocks, Hong (2000) theoretically shows that 
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the increase in sensitivity to noise risk outpaces the increase in sensitivity to the 
underlying fundamentals. Since hedgers are uninformed and only learn about 
fundamental values by observing futures prices, they find it increasingly difficult to 
extract fundamental values from futures prices as the contract approaches maturity. 
Therefore, information asymmetry rises as the futures contract approaches expiration 
(Hong’s H1). Faced with a larger information disadvantage, uninformed hedgers 
rationally reduce their trading. This decreases the ability of informed speculators, now 
having fewer counterparties, to trade which then consequently leads to less private 
information being impounded into the futures price as well as lowering futures return 
volatility (Hong’s H2). Thus, while Samuelson’s price elasticity effect will cause a rise 
in return volatility as futures contracts near maturity, Hong’s speculative effect will cause 
a reduction in return volatility as futures contracts near maturity. 
In this study, I simultaneously test both the price elasticity effect and the speculative 
effect. I utilize a mediation analysis method (see Judd and Kenny, 1981; Sobel, 1982; 
Baron and Kenny, 1986) to separate the time-to-maturity pattern of return volatility (i.e., 
the overall effect) into the speculative effect and the price elasticity effect.3 I treat the 
price elasticity effect as a direct effect that time-to-maturity has on return volatility, and 
treat the speculative effect as an indirect effect caused by the mediating role that 
information asymmetry has on the time-to-maturity – return volatility relationship. The 
mediation analysis involves three steps. First, I test the relationship between information 
asymmetry and time-to-maturity (i.e., Hong’s H1). Second, I test the impact that 
information asymmetry has on futures return volatility (i.e., Hong’s H2). Using the 
results of these first two steps, I can then test for the existence of a speculative effect. 
                                                             
3 I discuss in greater detail the regressions used for the mediation analysis in Section 2.3. 
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Third, I examine the direct effect (the price elasticity effect) and the overall effect (price 
elasticity plus speculative effects) of time-to-maturity on futures return volatility.  
More specifically, I investigate the relationship between information asymmetry and 
time-to-maturity by examining transaction-level data for twelve futures contracts traded 
on the CME Group. The database covers an 11-year period from 2006 to 2016. I use 
Madhavan, Richardson, and Rooman’s (1997) model to estimate the information 
asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread, and then use this measure as our proxy for 
the daily level of asymmetric information. My empirical results show that information 
asymmetry increases significantly as the futures contracts approach maturity, thus 
confirming Hong’s (2000) first hypothesis (H1).  For every 10-day period that a futures 
contract approaches its maturity, its information asymmetry level increases by an average 
of 3.64%. 
Next, I examine the impact of information asymmetry on future return volatility, which 
I measure using daily realized volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998). Hong’s (2000) 
prediction of a negative relationship between information asymmetry and return 
volatility is based on the assumption that uninformed hedgers choose to trade less when 
facing higher information asymmetry. This leads to less fundamental information being 
reflected in the futures price (as there are less counterparties for informed traders to trade 
with), thereby lowering return volatility. In reality, however, uninformed hedgers may 
not learn about their informational disadvantage (quoted Donald Rumsfeld: “…but there 
are also unknown unknowns. There are things we do not know we don't know.”). First, 
they may not be able to compare what they derive from observing the futures market with 
the private information held by speculators, since speculators obviously do not share such 
information with them. Second, if their motivation to trade is mainly to hedge, then they 
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will have a smaller incentive or capacity to learn about their informational disadvantage. 
They may, for example, be liquidity traders who are more concerned about addressing 
liquidity shocks. In fact, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) theoretically show that 
uninformed liquidity traders facilitate informed trading, which leads to higher return 
volatility. Shalen (1993) proposes that when uninformed traders have less accurate 
expectation about the fundamental, return volatility increases. Daigler and Wiley (1999) 
document that trading volume by uninformed investors is positively related to return 
volatility. As a result, I expect that information asymmetry has a positive effect on return 
volatility, instead of a negative one suggested by Hong (2000). 
My empirical test of the second hypothesis (H2) supports my expectation. The results 
show a strong and positive impact information asymmetry has on return volatility across 
twelve futures. On average, a one standard deviation increase in information asymmetry 
leads to a rise by half of a standard deviation in return volatility. Those results, coupled 
with the results for H1 (information asymmetry increases closer to maturity), suggest that 
the speculative effect should have a positive impact on return volatility as the futures 
contract rolls toward maturity instead of a negative impact. My calculation of the 
speculative effect shows that its positive impact on return volatility is statistically 
significant to at least the five percent level for all futures. On the other hand, I only find 
evidence for the price elasticity effect in five of the futures. Economically, I find that the 
speculative effect raises daily realized volatility by an average of 2.22% for every ten 
trading days. The results are robust when I control for return volatility autocorrelation, 
use Huang and Stoll’s (1997) adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread as an 
alternative measure of information asymmetry, or measure the MRR asymmetric 
information component as percentage of the spread instead of absolute dollar value. 
Moreover, my subsample analysis shows that while the positive relationship between 
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information asymmetry and return volatility is strong during both the crisis and post-
crisis periods, the negative relationship between time-to-maturity and information 
asymmetry is weaker during the crisis. This is consistent with the notion that noise risks 
are more persistent during the crisis. 
 
2.2. Related literature 
The most widely known explanation for a causal relationship between time-to-maturity 
and futures return volatility is Samuelson’s (1965) argument that futures prices impound 
more price-sensitive information as the futures contract approaches maturity (i.e., the 
Samuelson effect). Whilst there is some empirical support for this price elasticity effect, 
the evidence to date is neither consistent across futures markets, nor is it consistent over 
time. For example, Rutledge (1976) finds support for the price elasticity effect in silver 
and cocoa futures, but not in wheat and soybean oil. Milonas (1986) documents the 
presence of the price elasticity effect in several commodities, but not in corn. Similarly, 
Khoury and Yourougou (1993) find evidence of price elasticity in some agricultural 
commodity futures, but not in canola.  
To address these empirical shortcomings, Anderson and Danthine (1983) develop an 
alternative explanation for predictable patterns in futures return volatility over time.  
Their state variable hypothesis argues that futures return volatility will be higher in 
periods whenever a relatively large amount of uncertainty about the supply and demand 
of the underlying asset is resolved. The Samuelson effect then becomes a special case in 
which the resolution of uncertainty is clustered near the maturity of the futures contract. 
In effect, Anderson and Danthine (1983) propose a broad seasonality effect in place of 
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Samuelson’s maturity effect.  The empirical evidence for this state variable hypothesis 
(e.g., seasonality effect) is mixed.  Whilst Anderson (1985) finds that the seasonality 
effect is more important than the maturity effect in explaining futures return volatility, 
Bessembinder et al. (1996) and Duong and Kalev (2008) find strong evidence of the 
Samuelson effect even after controlling for seasonality. 
Bessembinder et al. (1996) examine net-carry-cost effects and propose that the price 
elasticity effect is more likely to hold in futures markets for real assets, such as 
commodities, where the covariation between spot price changes and changes in net carry 
costs is negative. They find support for this negative covariance hypothesis by showing 
that the price elasticity effect holds for agricultural commodities and crude oil, while it 
is weaker for metals and non-existent for Treasury bonds and S&P 500 index futures. On 
the other hand, Duong and Kalev (2008) find the presence of price elasticity effects in 
agricultural futures but not for metals, energy, or financial futures.   
Hong (2000) approaches the issue from a different perspective and points out that 
previous models which attempt to explain the relationship between time-to-maturity and 
return volatility assume that investors are symmetrically informed. That may not be the 
case in practice. For example, Roll (1984) shows that a substantial part of orange juice 
futures price movement is not explained by public information, which suggests that 
investors bring their own private information into the market. Lai et al. (2014) document 
that the average probability of informed trading in 47 equity markets around the world is 
27.9%. The reason information asymmetry exists could be due to some market 
participants having better capability or stronger motivation to acquire private information 
than others (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; 
Wang, 1994; He and Wang, 1995). Furthermore, their interpretations of information may 
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not be homogeneous (De Long et al., 1990; Harris and Raviv, 1993; Shalen, 1993; Wang, 
1998).  
The extant literature shows that the presence of information asymmetry has significant 
impacts across asset markets. In the stock market, information asymmetry results in 
discounted equity price due to higher risk premium (Wang, 1993; Chan et al., 2008), 
higher cost of capital (Admati, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 
2004; Duarte et al., 2008), higher volatility (Wang, 1994); higher stock returns (Easley 
et al., 2002), and lower liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). In the bond market, 
information asymmetry leads to higher yield spread (Lu et al., 2010), higher trading cost 
(Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008), higher expected returns (Li et al., 2009), and lower price 
(An et al., 2011). For futures, previous studies mainly focus on the relationship between 
information asymmetry and futures return volatility (Shalen, 1993; Daigler and Wiley, 
1999). 
Hong (2000) develops a dynamic model to study the impact of asymmetric information 
among futures market participants on the Samuelson effect. Hong’s (2000) model posits 
that the time-to-maturity pattern of futures return volatility comprises a price elasticity 
effect, which is identical to the Samuelson effect, and a speculative effect that arises from 
the relationships that information asymmetry has with time-to-maturity and with return 
volatility. The speculative effect exists because the market consists of two types of 
investors: informed speculators and uninformed hedgers. Hedgers trade futures contracts 
to hedge their spot positions, while speculators trade futures to take advantage of their 
private information related to underlying asset fundamentals as well as to hedge their 
nonmarketed risk (i.e., noise risk).   
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Since hedgers are uninformed, they try to learn about the fundamentals of underlying 
asset values by observing futures prices. Hong (2000) argues that under normal 
conditions, shocks to fundamental values of the underlying assets are more persistent 
than shocks due to noise. In this case, when the futures contract is far from maturity, 
price movements are mainly due to shocks to the fundamental, since noise shocks are not 
persistent and will die away in the near time horizon. Information asymmetry is therefore 
minimal. As the futures contract rolls towards maturity, its sensitivity to noise shocks 
increases, making it more difficult for uninformed hedgers to extract fundamental values 
from observing noisier futures prices. Facing an increase in asymmetric information, 
hedgers reduce their futures trading activity which, in turn, leads to a reduction in futures 
return volatility. Following this line of reasoning, Hong’s (2000) proposed speculative 
effect has a downward impact on the time-to-maturity pattern of return volatility.   
More specifically, Hong’s (2000) speculative effect is based on two central hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis (H1) is that information asymmetry increases as the time-to-maturity 
approaches. The second hypothesis (H2) is that higher levels of information asymmetry 
lead to lower levels of futures return volatility. This second hypothesis (H2) is based on 
the assumption that uninformed hedgers rationally learn of the widening information gap 
between themselves and informed speculators. But such knowledge may not be the case. 
In contrast, I argue that uninformed hedgers are unlikely to know with any degree of 
certainty how much private information is in the possession of the speculators.  Without 
such knowledge, it would be difficult for hedgers to gauge the size of the information 
gap between themselves and the speculators at any point in time, or to estimate the 
changes in this information gap over time.  
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In addition, hedgers might be at least as concerned about liquidity shocks (which are 
observable) as they are about changes in asymmetric information (which might not be 
observable). If hedgers do not observe changes in information asymmetry and simply 
focus on being liquidity traders, they may not reduce their trading activity as the futures 
contract approaches its time-to-maturity. If the increase in asymmetric information does 
not cause hedgers to reduce their trading activity as maturity approaches, then return 
volatility need not decrease as maturity approaches. 
Previous studies provide some theoretical and empirical support to my conjecture that on 
the positive impact information asymmetry has on return volatility. Admati and 
Pfleiderer’s (1988) theoretical model shows that the trading activity of uninformed 
liquidity traders (i.e., hedgers) increases with their demand for hedging – a demand that 
is likely to increase as time-to-maturity decreases. Their model also suggests that 
increases in hedging demand and uninformed trading activities are facilitated by 
increasing levels of informed trading, thus leading to lower futures return volatility as 
maturity approaches. In addition, Shalen (1993) argues that when uninformed traders 
have less accurate information about underlying asset fundamental values, they trade at 
a wider price range and adjust their expectation more frequently. As a result, return 
volatility will increase with higher levels of information asymmetry. Daigler and Wiley 
(1999) present empirical evidence showing that the trading volume of uninformed traders 
is positively related to futures return volatility, while the trading volume of informed 
investors is negatively related to return volatility.  
In summary, I argue that uninformed hedgers are unlikely to be able to gauge the level 
of private information that speculators possess at any point in time. If this “information 
gap” is unobservable, then it is unlikely to explain uninformed trading behavior – and its 
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proposed impact on return volatility through Hong’s (2000) speculative effect – as 
futures contracts approach their times-to-maturity. In addition, if uninformed traders are 
more concerned about liquidity shocks than information asymmetry shocks then they are 
more likely to behave as liquidity traders as futures contracts approach their times-to-
maturity. Therefore, I hypothesize that the speculative effect will increase futures return 
volatility as time-to-maturity approaches. 
 
2.3. Data and methods 
To test my hypothesis, I collect data for twelve commodity futures traded on four 
exchanges of the CME Group, the world's largest futures marketplace. These futures 
contracts are the most liquid, with the highest trading volumes, for their respective 
commodity groups.4 I collect intraday tick-by-tick trades and quotes from Thomson 
Reuter Tick History (TRTH) between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2016 for these 
futures contracts (for feeder cattle the data is from November 1, 2007). Following the 
literature, I construct a closest-to-maturity time series for each futures by rolling over the 
front contract (i.e., the contract closest to maturity). When the front contract’s trading 
volume falls below that of the next contract in the maturity cycle, I roll the contract over 
to obtain a continuous time series.  
Using the above time series, I measure the daily level of information asymmetry in each 
futures market from the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread, 
derived from Madhavan, Richardson, and Rooman’s (1997) model (MRR). This is a 
                                                             
4 Except for feeder cattle, the average daily trading volume for the futures included in my data is well 
above 10,000 contracts. 
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commonly-used measure to capture information asymmetry across various asset markets, 
including equity (Riordan et al., 2013; Armstrong el al., 2011), fixed income (Green, 
2004), futures (Huang, 2004). and options (Ahn et al., 2008; Muravyev, 2016). The MRR 
model also matches well with Hong’s (2000) characterization of information asymmetry 
that is derived from the sequence of trades in the market. Specifically, the MRR model 
suggests that the effective bid-ask spread can be decomposed into its information 
asymmetry and liquidity components. The information asymmetry component measures 
the part of the spread that market makers require compensation for as they must take on 
the risk of trading with informed traders. Specifically, the MRR model is: 
− = ( + ) − ( + ) + + −               (1) 
where −  is the change in transaction prices between two consecutive trades,  
is the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread,  is the liquidity 
component,  is the first-order autocorrelation of the order flow, and  is the trade 
initiation indicator (i.e., = 1 if the trade is at the ask, -1 if the trade is at the bid, and 
0 if the trade is inside the bid-ask spread),  is the error term, and  is an independent-
and-identically distributed random variable with a mean of zero. The set of parameters 
( , , , ), where  is the probability of a transaction taking place inside the spread, 





| | − (1 −  )
−
( − )
( − ) ⎠
⎟
⎞
= 0.                                                    (2) 
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where  = − − ( + ) + ( + ) , and  is a constant. My 
proxy for information asymmetry is the asymmetric information component of the bid-
ask spread ( ). 
For the daily volatility estimates, I use the realized return volatility (RV) calculated from 
the daily sum of squared five-minute interval returns, measured in natural logarithm 
(Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998). The latest quotes available at or prior to each five-
minute mark are used to construct the five-minute price series. I use mid-point quotes to 
calculate the five-minute returns to avoid bid-ask bounce issues (Roll, 1984). The RV 
measure is defined as follows: 




2                  (3) 
where  indicates the number of five-minute intervals throughout the trading day . 
In Table 2.1 I provide details about the futures in my sample, including the type of 
underlying commodity, the exchange where the futures contract trades, and the related 
expiration months. Table 2.1 also includes the means and standard deviations of the daily 
return volatility (RV) and information asymmetry ( ) for each futures time series. I 
also present information asymmetry as the percentage of the daily bid-ask spread (i.e., 
/( + )) to gauge its economic significance. The average daily return 
volatility ranges from -4.954 to -3.206. The average daily information asymmetry 
component ranges from 0.0038 cents (soybean oil) to 0.2781 cents (crude oil). On 
average, information asymmetry appears to account for more than 40% of the daily bid-
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics. 
Commodity group Futures Futures 
exchange 
Expiration month Mean (std.) daily 
return volatility 
Mean (std.) daily information 
asymmetry 










       






       






       






       






       






       






       






Return volatility is the natural logarithm of the daily sum of the squared five-minute returns. Information asymmetry is the Madhavan, 
Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) daily information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread measured in absolute value in US cents 





Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics (continued). 
Commodity group Futures Futures 
exchange 
Expiration month Mean (std.) daily 
return volatility 
Mean (std.) daily information 
asymmetry 










       






       






       






Return volatility is the natural logarithm of the daily sum of the squared five-minute returns. Information asymmetry is the Madhavan, 
Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) daily information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread measured in absolute value in US cents 
( ) and as the percentage of the spread ( /( + )). 
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I conduct my empirical analysis based on the mediation regression framework of Judd 
and Kenny (1981), Sobel (1982), and Baron and Kenny (1986). The mediation 
framework allows me to investigate how return volatility can be influenced by time-to-
maturity via two channels. The first channel represents a direct channel (i.e., the price 
elasticity effect), and the second channel is an indirect channel (i.e., the speculative 
effect) with its accompanying mediating variable, information asymmetry. For the 
indirect channel to work in the manner proposed by Hong (2000), time-to-maturity must 
affect information asymmetry (i.e., his first hypothesis, or H1) which, in turn, influences 
return volatility (i.e., his second hypothesis, or H2). The overall effect on return volatility 
is the sum of the direct and indirect effects. Figure 2.1 provides a conceptual illustration 
of this mediation model.  
 








  The overall effect: = + ( × ) 
 
This figure illustrates the mediation framework we use to separate the speculative effect and the price 
elasticity effect. The return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship materializes from two channels; 
with one being classified as the direct channel (the price elasticity effect), and the second being an 
indirect channel (the speculative effect) through a mediating variable (information asymmetry). For 
the indirect channel to work, time-to-maturity must affect information asymmetry, which then, in turn, 








The speculative effect 





The mediation regression framework to test the magnitude and statistical significance of 
each effect involves three regressions. Time-to-maturity (TTM) is measured by the 
number of days to maturity. I include dummy variables for each month of the year 
(MONTH) to address seasonality effects, and the natural logarithm of the number of 
trades that occur during the day (LN_NT) to account for liquidity. I also include year 
fixed-effects to account for time trends. The regression models are defined as follows: 
          = + + _ + +                                             (4) 
= + + + _ + +                              (5) 
= +Ψ + _ + +                                                  (6) 
Equation (4) is used to establish the time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry 
(coefficient ); Equation (5) is used to separate the impact information asymmetry has 
on return volatility (coefficient ) from that of time-to-maturity (the price elasticity 
effect, or coefficient ); and Equation (6) is used to determine the overall effect of time-
to-maturity on return volatility (Ψ). The indirect effect (i.e., the speculative effect) can 
be calculated as either (Ψ− ψ) or ( ∗ ), since both will produce the same result (Judd 
and Kenny, 1981; Baron and Kenny, 1986). The significance (t-statistics) for each effect 
is calculated using the standard errors obtained from the regressions based on Equations 
(4), (5), and (6) following Sobel (1982) and Baron and Kenny (1986). Specifically, the 
standard error for the speculative effect is + ; for the direct effect, it is ; 
and for the overall effect, it is , where , , , and  are the standard errors of , 
, , and Ψ, respectively. 
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2.4. Empirical results  
 
2.4.1. The time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry 
I start my analysis by examining Hong’s (2000) prediction that information asymmetry 
rises as futures contracts approach maturity (i.e., H1). I divide each futures contract into 
two parts based on the number of days to maturity. The results in Table 2.2 show that, 
except for Silver and Copper, the average level of information asymmetry is statistically 
higher for contracts that have less than the median number of days to maturity relative to 
contracts that have more than the median number of days to maturity. The differences 
are statistically significant at the 10% level for Live cattle, at the 5% level for Feeder 
cattle, and at the 1% level for the remaining eight futures contracts. Taking Gold as an 
example, the average information asymmetry is 284.93 cents for the period far from 
maturity, and 304 cents for the period close to maturity. The difference represents a 
6.69% increase in information asymmetry. Similar analysis for all the futures indicates 
that, on average, information asymmetry increases by 8.75% as futures move from being 
more than the median number of days away from maturity to being closer than the median 




Table 2.2: Univariate tests of the relationship between information 
asymmetry and time-to-maturity. 
Futures Information asymmetry (x10-2)  






Corn 5.32 6.04 0.72*** 
(6.01) 
    
Soybean 5.21 6.27 1.06*** 
(7.70) 
    
Soybean meal 3.43 3.75 0.32*** 
(3.69) 
    
Soybean oil 0.36 0.41 0.05*** 
(3.90) 
    
Wheat 9.60 10.75 1.15*** 
(6.58) 
    
Feeder cattle 2.50 2.62 0.12** 
(1.70) 
    
Lean hogs 1.16 1.29 0.13*** 
(3.31) 
    
Live cattle 1.07 1.12 0.05* 
(1.57) 
    
Copper 1.94 1.95 0.01 
(0.08) 
    
Gold 284.93 304.00 19.07*** 
(3.20) 
    
Silver 11.76 11.59 -0.17 
(-0.42) 
    
Crude oil 26.22 28.70 2.48*** 
(3.29) 
This table presents the average daily level of information asymmetry 
estimated from Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) daily 
information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread for periods 
close to, and far from, maturity of each futures based on whether it has 
less, or more, than the median number of contract days to maturity. *, 







To further test this relationship, Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 present the regression results 
from Equation (4) of regressing the information asymmetry measure, , on the 
number of days to maturity (TTM), both without (Panel A) and with (Panel B) controlling 
for seasonality (month dummies) and liquidity (LN_NT).5 I expect a negative coefficient 
for TTM if information asymmetry increases as maturity nears (i.e., information 
asymmetry is negatively related to the number of days to maturity). As expected, the 
coefficients for TTM are negative and statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels for 
all futures in both Tables. The proportional increase in information asymmetry over a 
futures life can be substantial. Using Corn as an illustration, the average level of 
information asymmetry is 0.0568 cents (see Table 2.1). The coefficient of -0.408x10-3 
for TTM in Table 2.4 implies that when a Corn futures contract rolls another 10 days 
towards maturity, information asymmetry will rise by 0.00408 cents ((−10) ×
(−0.408 × 10 )), or 7.18% (0.00408/0.0568). Similar analyses for the other futures 
contracts in our sample show that the average 10-day increase in information asymmetry 
is 3.64%. 
                                                             
5 Our results are qualitatively similar if we measure time-to-maturity using a squared or logarithmic scale.  
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Table 2.3: Testing the time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry without controlling for seasonality and liquidity.  
 Corn Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Wheat Feeder cattle 












       












       
Fixed Effects Year Year Year Year Year Year 
Observations  2726  2727  2722  2727  2726 2252 
Adjusted R2  0.558  0.473  0.520  0.581  0.596 0.565 
 Lean hogs Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil 












       












       
Fixed Effects Year Year Year Year Year Year 
Observations  2728  2723 2728 2730 2725 2726 
Adjusted R2  0.529  0.641 0.816 0.441 0.655 0.360 
This table presents the results for testing the time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry using the following regression: 
= + + , where information asymmetry is measured by the daily information asymmetry component of the bid-
ask spread calculated using Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) model ( ). Time to maturity (TTM) is the number of 
days until expiration. Year fixed-effect is included. All t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on Newey and West (1987) 




Table 2.4: Testing the time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry with controlling for seasonality and liquidity.  
 Corn Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Wheat Feeder cattle 












       



























       
Fixed Effects Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month 
Observations  2726  2727  2722  2727  2726 2252 
Adjusted R2  0.654  0.663  0.667  0.737  0.631 0.572 
 Lean hogs Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil 












       














       












       
Fixed Effects Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month 
Observations  2728  2723 2728 2730 2725 2726 
Adjusted R2  0.540  0.682 0.826 0.544 0.683 0.550 
This table presents the results for testing the time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry using the following regression: 
= + + _ + + , where information asymmetry is measured by the daily information asymmetry 
component of the bid-ask spread calculated using Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) model ( ). Time to maturity 
(TTM) is the number of days until expiration. LN_NT is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the day.  MONTH 
represents a vector of dummy variables for each month. Year fixed-effect is included. All t-statistics reported in parentheses are 




2.4.2. The impact of information asymmetry on futures return volatility 
Having established the presence of a time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry 
for all of our futures contracts, I proceed to examine the impact of information asymmetry 
on futures return volatility. I test my argument against Hong’s (2000) H2 by estimating 
Equation (5). I regress return volatility (RV) on both information asymmetry ( ) and 
time-to-maturity (TTM), whilst controlling for seasonality (MONTH) and liquidity 
(LN_NT). Table 2.5 shows that, consistent with our expectation, the coefficients for  
are positive and significant at the one percent level across all 12 futures contracts, 
suggesting that increases in information asymmetry leads to increases in return volatility. 
Using the wheat contract as an example, we can see that the estimated coefficient for 
 is 7.664. When information asymmetry increases by one standard deviation 
(0.0460, see Table 2.1), return volatility rises by 0.3525 (0.046x7.664), which is 
approximately half of its standard deviation (0.749, see Table 2.1). The coefficients for 
TTM, which capture the price elasticity effect, are negative and significant for five futures 
contracts, and insignificant for seven futures contracts. The coefficients for LN_NT are 
positive and significant at the one percent level for all futures. This result is consistent 




Table 2.5: Testing the impact of information asymmetry and time-to-maturity on return volatility. 
 Corn Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Wheat Feeder cattle 












       








































       
Fixed Effects Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month 
Observations  2726  2727  2722  2727  2726 2252 
Adjusted R2  0.569  0.457  0.483  0.349  0.491 0.524 
This table presents the results for testing the impact of information asymmetry and time-to-maturity on return volatility using the 
following regression: = + + + _ + + , where return volatility (RV) is the natural 
logarithm of the daily five-minute realized volatility. Information asymmetry is measured by the daily information asymmetry 
component of the bid-ask spread calculated following Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) model ( ). Time to maturity 
(TTM) is the number of days until expiration. LN_NT is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the day. MONTH 
represents a vector of dummy variables for each month. Year fixed-effect is included. All t-statistics reported in parentheses are 






Table 2.5: Testing the impact of information asymmetry and time-to-maturity on return volatility (continued). 
 Lean hogs Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil 












       



























       












       
Fixed Effects Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month Year, Month 
Observations  2728  2723 2728 2730 2725 2726 
Adjusted R2  0.392  0.527 0.467 0.579 0.433 0.583 
This table presents the results for testing the impact of information asymmetry and time-to-maturity on return volatility using the 
following regression: = + + + _ + + , where return volatility (RV) is the natural 
logarithm of the daily five-minute realized volatility. Information asymmetry is measured by the daily information asymmetry 
component of the bid-ask spread calculated following Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) model ( ). Time to maturity 
(TTM) is the number of days until expiration. LN_NT is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the day. MONTH 
represents a vector of dummy variables for each month. Year fixed-effect is included. All t-statistics reported in parentheses are 




2.4.3. The speculative effect and the price elasticity effect 
After confirming the relationship that information asymmetry has with time-to-maturity 
(i.e., upward trending as the futures contract expires) and with return volatility (positive), 
I expect the speculative effect to have a positive and significant impact on return 
volatility as maturity approaches. To confirm this conjecture, I estimate Equation (6) to 
get the overall effect of time-to-maturity on return volatility. I then proceed to use these 
results, along with the results from regressions of Equations (4) and (5), to calculate the 
coefficients and statistical significance of the speculative and the price elasticity effects.  
I report the results of these two effects in Table 2.6. The coefficients for the speculative 
effect are consistently negative and significant to at least the five percent level for all 
futures contracts. On the other hand, I find significant price elasticity effects in only five 
futures contracts. The coefficients for the price elasticity are negative and significant at 
the ten percent level for crude oil, and to at least the five percent level for soybean meal, 
soybean oil, wheat, and live cattle. The coefficients are insignificant for the other seven 
futures contracts.  
The economic impact of the speculative effect on return volatility is also significant. 
Taking soybean as an example, the coefficient of -3.586x10-3 for the speculative effect 
indicates an increase of 0.03586 ((−10) × (−3.589 × 10 )) in return volatility when the 
futures contract rolls forward ten days toward its maturity. Since return volatility is 
measured as a natural logarithm, this means that the speculative effect is responsible for 
an increase of 3.65% ( . − 100%) in daily realized volatility. Similar analyses for 
other futures contracts in my sample show that, on average, the speculative effect raises 
daily realized volatility by 2.22% for every ten days.
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Table 2.6: The speculative effect and the price elasticity effect. 
 Corn Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Wheat Feeder cattle 












       












       












Observations 2726 2727 2722 2727 2726 2252 
 Lean hogs Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil 












       












       












Observations 2728 2723 2728 2730 2725 2726 
This table presents the speculative effect, the price elasticity effect, and the overall effect of time-to-maturity on return volatility. We regress (i) 
= + + _ + + , (ii) = + + + _ + + , and (iii) = +Ψ +
_ + + , where return volatility (RV) is the natural logarithm of the daily five-minute realized volatility.  is the daily 
information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread estimated from Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) model. TTM is the number 
of days until expiration. LN_NT is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the day. MONTH represents a vector of dummy variables 
for every month of the year. Year fixed-effect is included in all regressions. The coefficient for the overall effect is Ψ, the coefficient for the direct 
effect (the price elasticity effect) is , and the coefficient for the indirect effect (the speculative effect) is ( × ). The significance (t-statistics) 
for each effect is calculated following Sobel (1982) and Baron and Kenny (1986). Superscripts *, **, and *** denote the significance levels of 




To provide a visual illustration of these effects, Figure 2.2 shows the impact of the 
speculative effect on the time-to-maturity pattern of return volatility. We can see that the 
speculative effect consistently generates an upward pattern of return volatility over the 
life of a futures contract. In futures markets where the price elasticity effect is significant, 
the speculative effect strengthens the price elasticity effect. In futures markets where the 
price elasticity effect is insignificant, the speculative effect alone drives the time-to-
maturity pattern of return volatility (the overall effect). The coefficients for the overall 
effect are negative and significant to at least the five percent level for nine futures 








This figure illustrates the impact of the speculative effect on the time-to-maturity pattern of return 
volatility based on the fitted values of our empirical results. Return volatility is measured by the natural 
logarithm of the daily sum of the squared five-minute returns. The speculative effect is the difference 





There are several points worth discussing from the above results. First, the weak results 
for the price elasticity effect may be explained by the state variable hypothesis (Anderson 
and Danthine, 1983). Since the price elasticity effect is driven by the futures market’s 
reaction to information flows, the shape of the time-to-maturity pattern of return volatility 
directly attributed to this effect depends on when information flows are clustered over 
the life of a futures contract. If more price-relevant information flows into the market 
near maturity, then we can see a positive price elasticity effect on the slope of return 
volatility. Otherwise, if information arrive evenly over the futures contract life or is 
clustered far from maturity, then the price elasticity effect could be insignificant or even 
negative.  
Second, my results suggest that the time-to-maturity patterns of return volatility observed 
in previous studies are not only caused by the Samuelson (price elasticity) effect, but 
rather by the interplay between this effect and the speculative effect; more specifically, 
by my proposed version of the speculative effect where asymmetric information and 
return volatility are positively related. Consequently, variations in any factor that 
influences the speculative effect or the price elasticity effect can lead to a change in the 
pattern of futures return volatility. These complicating factors are likely to be the reason 





2.5. An illustrative model of return volatility when uninformed liquidity hedgers 
are unaware of their informational disadvantage 
 
To further support the point that information asymmetry gives rise to return volatility, I 
develop a simple, illustrative model where uninformed hedgers are unaware of their 
informational disadvantage, or simply behave as liquidity traders6. The model’s 
prediction is consistent with my empirical results that rising information asymmetry 
positively impact futures return volatility as the contract rolls towards maturity. 
We consider two types of traders: a mass  of uninformed hedgers (denoted by traders 
), a mass (1− ) of informed speculators (denoted by traders ), and three periods, 
indexed as = 0 (far away from maturity), = 1 (close to maturity), and = 2 
(maturity).7 At = 0 and = 1, a trader can enter a futures contract that delivers a 
commodity at = 2. The commodity delivered at = 2 yields an ex ante uncertain 
payoff of ~ ̅, .  
Following Hong (2000), we assume that when the futures contract is far away from 
maturity, information asymmetry is minimal. In particular, at = 0, all traders have 
identical prior beliefs that ~ ̅, . When it is close to maturity (i.e., = 1), 
information asymmetry arises due to traders  receiving a private signal about the 
uncertain payoff of the commodity: = + , where ~ (0, ), whereas traders  do 
not receive such private information. Similar to Hong (2000), we also assume that traders 
                                                             
6 I owe a debt of gratitude to Jeffrey Chia-Feng Yu (University of Adelaide) for assisting me in the 
development of the model. 
7 This is a simplification of the model dynamics considered in Hong (2000). 
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 also receive nonmarketed income shocks, ~ (0, ), = 0, 1, which has an impact 
on their demand of futures. All uncertainty is resolved at = 2.  
Our key departure from Hong (2000) is that we assume that traders  do not learn about 
their informational disadvantage. It means that the trading behaviour of traders  is 
motivated by other reasons, not information. In other words, their aggregate demand for 
futures is represented by ℎ ~ (0, ), = 0, 1. There can be a multiple number of 
reasons for this, for example they might simply be liquidity traders (see Grossman and 
Stiglitz, 1980). This is justifiable if these traders are subject to exogenous liquidity shocks 
and, due to limited attention, the required time and effort to address liquidity needs 
dominate all other trading motives and leave them no incentive or capacity to learn about 
information (see, among others, Peng and Xiong, 2006; Duffie, 2010). Below we will 
show that this leads to results that are consistent with my empirical results.  
For simplicity, we follow Kelsey et al. (2011) and restrict our attention to linear trading 
strategies of speculators.8 Specifically, at t = 0, the trading strategy of traders  is as 
follows, respectively: 
= [ ( )− + ]                                           (7) 
where > 0 reflects the risk tolerance of traders , and  is the futures price at = 0. 
Equation (7) states that the demands of speculators are proportional to the difference 
between their expectations of the uncertain commodity payoff and the current futures 
price, plus an additional nonmarketed income shock. 
                                                             
8 Linear trading strategies can be ensured by assuming a CARA-normal model. Here, we follow Kelsey et 
al. (2011) and adopt linear trading strategies directly. 
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At = 0, traders  have identical prior beliefs that ~ ̅, . It follows that ( ) =
̅. The market clearing condition at = 0 requires: 
                          (1 − ) + ℎ = 0                                              (8) 
Solving for the equilibrium price ∗ yields: 
∗ = ̅ + +
ℎ
(1− )                                           (9) 
At = 1, the trading strategy of traders , is as follows, respectively: 
= [ ( | )− + ]                                       (10) 
where  is the futures price at = 1. Note that, at = 1, traders  update their posterior 
belief about the uncertain commodity payoff  based on the private signals , and their 
demand of futures is subject to the nonmarketed income shock at = 1, . 
By the Bayesian updating rule, we obtain: 
( | ) = ̅ +
+
− ̅                                              (11) 
The market clearing condition at = 1 requires: 
(1 − ) + ℎ = 0                                                 (12) 
Solving for the equilibrium price ∗ yields: 
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(1 − ) +                                     
(13) 
After deriving the equilibrium futures prices, ∗ and ∗, we are now ready to demonstrate 
how futures return volatility changes when moving from = 0 (far away from maturity) 
to = 1 (close to maturity).  The futures return volatility at  is referred to as the variance 
of the equilibrium futures price at . From Equations (9) and (13), the difference in futures 
return volatility between = 1 and = 0, , is given by 
=
+
                                                                    (14) 
which is positive, indicating that futures return volatility is higher the closer the contract 
is to maturity. This is contrast with Hong (2000), who argues that when futures are closer 
to maturity, the futures price moves less because uninformed hedgers rationally learn that 
they are more informationally disadvantaged, and hence less incentivised to trade. We, 
however, demonstrate that the relationship can potentially be the reverse if the trading 
behaviour of uninformed hedgers is driven by liquidity concerns and not based on 
learning about their informational disadvantage. We thus obtain the following result: If 
there is no learning by uninformed hedgers about their informational disadvantage, then 
as information asymmetry arises, futures return volatility increases when the contract is 





2.6. Robustness tests 
I conduct some additional tests for robustness. First, to account for potential 
autocorrelation in return volatility, I include the previous day’s return volatility as a 
control variable when we run our regressions. Table 2.7 shows that the results remain 
robust. The coefficients for the speculative effect are negative and significant at the five 
percent level for eleven futures contracts, and at the ten percent level for copper. 
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Table 2.7: Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship when controlling 
for autocorrelation in return volatility. 
 Corn Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Wheat Feeder cattle 
Time-to-maturity pattern of 













       
Impact of information asymmetry 













       












       












       












Observations 2725 2726 2721 2726 2725 2251 
This table examines the relationships information asymmetry has with time-to-maturity and return volatility, as well as the speculative effect, the 
price elasticity effect, and the overall effect of time-to-maturity on return volatility when controlling for autocorrelation in return volatility. We 
regress (i) = + + _ + + + , (ii) = + + + + _ + + , and 
(iii) = + Ψ + + _ + + , where return volatility (RV) is the natural logarithm of the daily five-minute realized 
volatility.  is the daily information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread estimated from Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) 
model. TTM is the number of days until expiration. LN_NT is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the day. MONTH represents a 
vector of dummy variables for every month of the year. Year fixed-effect is included in all regressions. The coefficient for the overall effect is Ψ, 
the coefficient for the direct effect (the price elasticity effect) is , and the coefficient for the indirect effect (the speculative effect) is ( × ). 
The significance (t-statistics) for each effect is calculated following Sobel (1982) and Baron and Kenny (1986). Superscripts *, **, and *** denote 




Table 2.7: Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship when controlling 
for autocorrelation in return volatility (continued). 
 Lean hogs Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil 
Time-to-maturity pattern of 













       
Impact of information asymmetry 













       












       












       












Observations 2727  2722 2727 2729 2724 2725 
This table examines the relationships information asymmetry has with time-to-maturity and return volatility, as well as the speculative effect, the 
price elasticity effect, and the overall effect of time-to-maturity on return volatility when controlling for autocorrelation in return volatility. We 
regress (i) = + + _ + + + , (ii) = + + + + _ + + , and 
(iii) = + Ψ + + _ + + , where return volatility (RV) is the natural logarithm of the daily five-minute realized 
volatility.  is the daily information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread estimated from Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) 
model. TTM is the number of days until expiration. LN_NT is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the day. MONTH represents a 
vector of dummy variables for every month of the year. Year fixed-effect is included in all regressions. The coefficient for the overall effect is Ψ, 
the coefficient for the direct effect (the price elasticity effect) is , and the coefficient for the indirect effect (the speculative effect) is ( × ). 
The significance (t-statistics) for each effect is calculated following Sobel (1982) and Baron and Kenny (1986). Superscripts *, **, and *** denote 
the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Second, I use Huang and Stoll’s (1997) adverse selection component of the bid-ask 
spread as an alternative measure of information asymmetry. Huang and Stoll’s (1997) 
three-way decomposition of the bid-ask spread is quite similar to the MRR method, 
although less commonly-used in the literature. The daily adverse selection component is 
computed by estimating the two following equations simultaneously using GMM 
(corresponding to their Equations (25) and (21), respectively) as follows: 
∆ = + ( + − 1) − (1− 2 ) +              (15)   
E( | ) = (1 − 2 )                                                                             (16) 
where ∆  is change in transaction price,  is the constant spread,  is the probability of 
trade reversals, and  is the trade indicator ( = 1 for a buyer-initiated trade and =
−1 for a seller-initiated trade). In addition,  is the adverse selection component of the 
spread,  is the inventory holding component, and (1− − ) is the order 
processing component. I then multiple  by the half-spread to get the absolute value 
of the component, as follows: 
= ×
̅
2                                                                               (17) 
where HS  is our information asymmetry measure on day , and ̅  is an estimated value 
of the constant spread calculated as the average spread of the trading day. 
Table 2.8 shows the results of Huang and Stoll’s (1997) three-way decomposition. The 
relationship between information asymmetry and time-to-maturity holds for all futures 
contracts, except for lean hogs. The impact that information asymmetry has on return 
53 
 
volatility remains strong at least at the five percent level of significance across all twelve 
futures contracts. As a result, the speculative effect is significant at least at the five 
percent level for nine futures, at the ten percent level for feeder cattle and soybean oil, 
and insignificant for lean hogs.  
I also measure MRR’s adverse selection component as a percentage of the spread (i.e., 
 
) to address the potential concern that the absolute bid-ask spread could correlate 
with return volatility. Table 2.9 indicates that the results for the time-to-maturity pattern 
of information asymmetry and the speculative effect remain highly significant for all 




Table 2.8: Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship using Huang and 
Stoll’s (1997) adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. 
 Corn Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Wheat Feeder cattle 
Time-to-maturity pattern of 













       
Impact of information asymmetry 













       












       












       












Observations 2726 2727 2722 2727 2726 2252 
This table examines the relationships information asymmetry has with time-to-maturity and return volatility, as well as the speculative effect, the 
price elasticity effect, and the overall effect of time-to-maturity on return volatility using the following regressions (i) = + +
_ + + , (ii) = + + + _ + + , and (iii) = + Ψ + _ + + , 
where return volatility ( ) is the natural logarithm of the daily five-minute realized volatility. Information asymmetry is measured by the daily 
absolute value of the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread (HS) calculated following Huang and Stoll’s (1997) model. Time to 
maturity (TTM) is the number of days until expiration. LN_NT is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the day. MONTH represents 
a vector of dummy variables for each month. Year fixed-effect is included in all regressions. The coefficient and significance (t-statistics) for the 
time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry are that for TTM from equation (i). The coefficient for the overall effect is Ψ, the coefficient 
for the direct effect (the price elasticity effect) is , and the coefficient for the indirect effect (the speculative effect) is ( × ). The significance 
(t-statistics) for each effect is calculated following Sobel (1982) and Baron and Kenny (1986). Superscripts *, **, and *** denote the significance 




Table 2.8: Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship using Huang and 
Stoll’s (1997) adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread (continued). 
 Lean hogs Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil 
Time-to-maturity pattern of 













       
Impact of information asymmetry 













       












       












       












Observations 2728 2723 2728 2730 2725 2726 
This table examines the relationships information asymmetry has with time-to-maturity and return volatility, as well as the speculative effect, the 
price elasticity effect, and the overall effect of time-to-maturity on return volatility using the following regressions (i) = + +
_ + + , (ii) = + + + _ + + , and (iii) = + Ψ + _ + + , 
where return volatility ( ) is the natural logarithm of the daily five-minute realized volatility. Information asymmetry is measured by the daily 
absolute value of the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread (HS) calculated following Huang and Stoll’s (1997) model. Time to 
maturity (TTM) is the number of days until expiration. LN_NT is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the day. MONTH represents 
a vector of dummy variables for each month. Year fixed-effect is included in all regressions. The coefficient and significance (t-statistics) for the 
time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry are that for TTM from equation (i). The coefficient for the overall effect is Ψ, the coefficient 
for the direct effect (the price elasticity effect) is , and the coefficient for the indirect effect (the speculative effect) is ( × ). The significance 
(t-statistics) for each effect is calculated following Sobel (1982) and Baron and Kenny (1986). Superscripts *, **, and *** denote the significance 




Table 2.9: Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship using the 
Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) information asymmetry component measured as percentage of the bid-ask spread. 
 Corn Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Wheat Feeder cattle 
Time-to-maturity pattern of 













       
Impact of information asymmetry 













       












       












       












Observations 2726 2727 2722 2727 2726 2252 
This table examines the relationships information asymmetry has with time-to-maturity and return volatility, as well as the speculative effect, the 
price elasticity effect, and the overall effect of time-to-maturity on return volatility using the following regressions (i) % = + +
_ + + , (ii) = + % + + _ + + , and (iii) = +Ψ + _ + +
, where return volatility ( ) is the natural logarithm of the daily five-minute realized volatility. Information asymmetry is the daily information 
asymmetry component measured as the percentage of the bid-ask spread ( % ), estimated using the Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s 
(1997) model. Time to maturity ( ) is the number of days until expiration. _  is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the 
day.   represents a vector of dummy variables for each month. Year fixed-effect is included in all regressions. The coefficient and 
significance (t-statistics) for the time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry are that for  from equation (i). The coefficient for the 
overall effect is Ψ, the coefficient for the direct effect (the price elasticity effect) is , and the coefficient for the indirect effect (the speculative 
effect) is ( × ). The significance (t-statistics) for each effect is calculated following Sobel (1982) and Baron and Kenny (1986). Superscripts *, 




Table 2.9: Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship using the 
Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) information asymmetry component measured as percentage of the bid-ask spread 
(continued). 
 Lean hogs Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil 
Time-to-maturity pattern of 













       
Impact of information asymmetry 













       












       












       












Observations 2728 2723 2728 2730 2725 2726 
This table examines the relationships information asymmetry has with time-to-maturity and return volatility, as well as the speculative effect, the 
price elasticity effect, and the overall effect of time-to-maturity on return volatility using the following regressions (i) % = + +
_ + + , (ii) = + % + + _ + + , and (iii) = +Ψ + _ + +
, where return volatility ( ) is the natural logarithm of the daily five-minute realized volatility. Information asymmetry is the daily information 
asymmetry component measured as the percentage of the bid-ask spread ( % ), estimated using the Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s 
(1997) model. Time to maturity ( ) is the number of days until expiration. _  is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the 
day.   represents a vector of dummy variables for each month. Year fixed-effect is included in all regressions. The coefficient and 
significance (t-statistics) for the time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry are that for  from equation (i). The coefficient for the 
overall effect is Ψ, the coefficient for the direct effect (the price elasticity effect) is , and the coefficient for the indirect effect (the speculative 
effect) is ( × ). The significance (t-statistics) for each effect is calculated following Sobel (1982) and Baron and Kenny (1986). Superscripts *, 
**, and *** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Finally, I conduct sub-sample analyses by investigating the 2007-2009 crisis period and 
post-crisis period separately. Table 2.10 shows the result for the crisis period and Table 
2.11 shows the result for the post-crisis period. During the crisis, the relationship between 
information asymmetry and time-to-maturity is generally weaker than our full-sample 
results. The reason could be that investors increasingly look to hedge their investments 
using commodity futures during the crisis. As a result, shocks from other markets (noise 
shocks) become more persistent. On the other hand, fundamental shocks are not directly 
affected by the crisis. Consequently, the increase in information asymmetry when the 
futures contract matures is not as significant, hence the weaker results. In contrast, the 






Table 2.10: Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship during the 2007-
2009 crisis period. 
 Corn Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Wheat Feeder cattle 
Time-to-maturity pattern of 













       
Impact of information asymmetry 













       












       












       












Observations 397 397 397 397 397 367 
This table examines the relationships information asymmetry has with time-to-maturity and return volatility, as well as the speculative effect, the 
price elasticity effect, and the overall effect of time-to-maturity on return volatility during the 2007-2009 crisis period (from 01/10/2007 to 
30/06/2009) using the following regressions (i) = + + _ + + , (ii) = + + + _ +
+ , and (iii) = + Ψ + _ + + , where return volatility (RV) is the natural logarithm of the daily five-
minute realized volatility.  is the daily information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread estimated from Madhavan, Richardson and 
Rooman’s (1997) model. TTM is the number of days until expiration. LN_NT is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the day. 
MONTH represents a vector of dummy variables for every month of the year. Year fixed-effect is included in all regressions. The coefficient for 
the overall effect is Ψ, the coefficient for the direct effect (the price elasticity effect) is , and the coefficient for the indirect effect (the speculative 
effect) is ( × ). The significance (t-statistics) for each effect is calculated following Sobel (1982) and Baron and Kenny (1986). Superscripts *, 




Table 2.10: Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship during the 2007-
2009 crisis period (continued). 
 Lean hogs Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil 
Time-to-maturity pattern of 













       
Impact of information asymmetry 













       












       












       












Observations 397 396 399 400 399 400 
This table examines the relationships information asymmetry has with time-to-maturity and return volatility, as well as the speculative effect, the 
price elasticity effect, and the overall effect of time-to-maturity on return volatility during the 2007-2009 crisis period (from 01/10/2007 to 
30/06/2009) using the following regressions (i) = + + _ + + , (ii) = + + + _ +
+ , and (iii) = + Ψ + _ + + , where return volatility (RV) is the natural logarithm of the daily five-
minute realized volatility.  is the daily information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread estimated from Madhavan, Richardson and 
Rooman’s (1997) model. TTM is the number of days until expiration. LN_NT is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the day. 
MONTH represents a vector of dummy variables for every month of the year. Year fixed-effect is included in all regressions. The coefficient for 
the overall effect is Ψ, the coefficient for the direct effect (the price elasticity effect) is , and the coefficient for the indirect effect (the speculative 
effect) is ( × ). The significance (t-statistics) for each effect is calculated following Sobel (1982) and Baron and Kenny (1986). Superscripts *, 





Table 2.11: Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship after the 2007-
2009 crisis period. 
 Corn Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Wheat Feeder cattle 
Time-to-maturity pattern of 













       
Impact of information asymmetry 













       












       












       












Observations 1891 1892 1892 1892 1891 1885 
This table examines the relationships information asymmetry has with time-to-maturity and return volatility, as well as the speculative effect, the 
price elasticity effect, and the overall effect of time-to-maturity on return volatility for the period after the 2007-2009 crisis (after 30/06/2009) 
using the following regressions (i) = + + _ + + , (ii) = + + + _ + +
, and (iii) = +Ψ + _ + + , where return volatility (RV) is the natural logarithm of the daily five-minute realized 
volatility.  is the daily information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread estimated from Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) 
model. TTM is the number of days until expiration. LN_NT is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the day. MONTH represents a 
vector of dummy variables for every month of the year. Year fixed-effect is included in all regressions. The coefficient for the overall effect is Ψ, 
the coefficient for the direct effect (the price elasticity effect) is , and the coefficient for the indirect effect (the speculative effect) is ( × ). 
The significance (t-statistics) for each effect is calculated following Sobel (1982) and Baron and Kenny (1986). Superscripts *, **, and *** denote 




Table 2.11: Testing the mediating role of information asymmetry on the return volatility – time-to-maturity relationship after the 2007-
2009 crisis period (continued). 
 Lean hogs Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil 
Time-to-maturity pattern of 













       
Impact of information asymmetry 













       












       












       












Observations 1891 1891 1892 1892 1888 1849 
This table examines the relationships information asymmetry has with time-to-maturity and return volatility, as well as the speculative effect, the 
price elasticity effect, and the overall effect of time-to-maturity on return volatility for the period after the 2007-2009 crisis (after 30/06/2009) 
using the following regressions (i) = + + _ + + , (ii) = + + + _ + +
, and (iii) = +Ψ + _ + + , where return volatility (RV) is the natural logarithm of the daily five-minute realized 
volatility.  is the daily information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread estimated from Madhavan, Richardson and Rooman’s (1997) 
model. TTM is the number of days until expiration. LN_NT is the natural logarithm of the number of trades during the day. MONTH represents a 
vector of dummy variables for every month of the year. Year fixed-effect is included in all regressions. The coefficient for the overall effect is Ψ, 
the coefficient for the direct effect (the price elasticity effect) is , and the coefficient for the indirect effect (the speculative effect) is ( × ). 
The significance (t-statistics) for each effect is calculated following Sobel (1982) and Baron and Kenny (1986). Superscripts *, **, and *** denote 





In this chapter, I show that, consistent with Hong’s (2000) first hypothesis, information 
asymmetry increases as the futures contract rolls towards maturity. But, in contrast to 
Hong’s second hypothesis, I find that information asymmetry increases return volatility. 
This leads to the mediating impact of information asymmetry on return volatility (the 
speculative effect) being positive as the futures contract nears maturity. I also present a 
model to illustrate that my findings could be attributed to uninformed hedgers not 
learning about their information disadvantage. The results for the price elasticity effect 


















THE LEVEL OF FUTURES MARKET 









In this chapter, I provide the second explanation for the mixed results on the Samuelson 
effect in the literature. Prior studies focus on the time-to-maturity pattern of futures return 
volatility (the volatility pattern) rather than the pattern of the sensitivity of futures return 
volatility to information flows (the sensitivity pattern). The Samuelson effect has the 
underlying assumption that the sensitivity pattern monotonically rises as the contract 
nears maturity, leading to a similar volatility pattern. This may not be true. In fact, it is 
more likely that the sensitivity pattern will vary, and be dependent upon, the level of 
market activity of the contract (see Kyle, 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; and 
Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993). In addition, as Anderson and Danthine (1983) 
highlight, information is not likely to flow uniformly into the market during the life of 
the futures contract, further leading to changes in the volatility pattern.  
Based on these points, I infer that the sensitivity and volatility patterns will not 
monotonically rise. Instead, I hypothesize that the sensitivity pattern will be a quadratic 
function of time-to-maturity. Specifically, I expect to find an inverted U-shape 
relationship, given that is the general pattern of market activity most contracts 
experience. Investigations by the Commodity Exchange Authority (1960) and Powers 
(1967) show that open interest, reflecting hedging demand, rises as commodities are 
produced and stored. It often peaks right after harvest (for agricultural futures) when 
stocks are highest, and starts to decrease as hedgers close their positions when stocks 
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move out of storage. Trading volume is expected to follow a similar pattern since trading 
by speculators generally corresponds to hedging activity (Working, 1970; Powers, 1967; 
Leuthold, 1983).9 Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1 shows the average trading volume and open 
interest over the life of September wheat futures contracts traded between 2003 and 2016. 
Both the levels of trading volume and open interest display an inverted U-shape pattern. 
Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) also document that futures return volatility is positively 
related to expected trading volumes and negatively related to expected open interest. 
Therefore, if the levels of trading volume and of open interest display a quadratic 
relationship with time-to-maturity, then I postulate that so too will the sensitivity pattern. 
I empirically test my hypothesis on twelve commodity futures trading on four exchanges 
under the Chicago Mercantile Exchange group of exchanges (CME Group). The futures 
include agricultural (grains, oilseeds, and livestock), metals and energy futures. I collect 
all contracts traded between January 1st, 2003 and June 30th, 2014. I represent volatility 
as the daily realized volatility calculated from the sum of the five-minute squared realized 
returns (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998) using intraday data from Thompson Reuters 
Tick History (TRTH). I measure information flows by the number of daily news items 
about the commodity, extracted from the Thompson Reuters News Analytics (TRNA) 
database. The TRNA database provides comprehensive data on daily commodity news 
coverage and has been used in previous studies examining commodity news flows (see, 
for example, Smales, 2014). I calculate SENSITIVITY, the measure of the sensitivity of 
                                                             
9 The literature (see Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993; Daigler and Wiley, 1999) suggests that the absolute 
value of trading volume and open interest is composed of the “expected” and “unexpected” components. 
The “unexpected” volume and open interest reflect shocks in information flows, which result in the day-
to-day seesaw shape. The “expected” (or “level” or “average”) volume and open interest represent the level 
of market activity related to non-informational factors (i.e., supply and demand), which follow a steady 
long-term pattern. My focus here is the expected volume and open interest.. 
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return volatility to information flows, as the ratio of return volatility to the number of 
daily news items. 
To formally establish that trading volume and open interest follows an inverted U-shape 
pattern over the life of a commodity futures contract, I regress each of them on the 
quadratic function of time-to-maturity. I measure time-to-maturity (TTM) as the squared 
root of the number of days to maturity. The results show that for both trading volume and 
open interest, the coefficient for TTM (TTM ) is positive (negative) and significant for 
all twelve commodities. This confirms the inverted U-shape pattern of futures trading 
volume and open interest.10  
To examine the changes in SENSITIVITY over a futures contract life, I start with a 
univariate analysis by dividing the sample into four quartiles based on the time-to-
maturity of each futures contract. I then examine the differences in the means of 
SENSITIVITY between the quartiles. The results provide evidence of an inverted U-shape 
sensitivity pattern for seven of the commodity futures (with the maxima reached in the 
third quartile for copper and silver, and in the second quartile for the other five futures). 
This supports the regression results that find the coefficients for TTM (TTM ) are 
positive (negative) and significant for all twelve futures. These results are robust when 
using as my proxy for information flows only news items that reference the commodity 
in the headline and when using the logarithm of the number of days to maturity to 
represent time. 
                                                             
10 Following Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) and Daigler and Wiley (1999), I also use the AR(10) and 
ARIMA(0,1,10) models to extract the expected daily trading volume and open interest. The results for the 
quadratic regressions using the expected values also indicate a clear inverted U-shape pattern. 
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To analyse the inverted U-shape of the time-to-maturity pattern of open interest, trading 
volume and SENSITIVITY, I calculate peak-to-maturity (PTM). PTM is the number of 
days between when the pattern peaks and the maturity date of the contract, measured as 
a percentage of the contract’s life. A smaller PTM will indicate that the pattern peaks 
later in the life of the contract (i.e. the pattern tilts more towards maturity). I find that 
open interest peaks around the half-life of a contract (the average PTM is 56%). On the 
other hand, the tilt of the trading volume pattern varies across futures. This suggests that 
the relationship between speculative trading and open interest suggested by the literature 
(Working, 1970; Powers, 1967; Leuthold, 1983) is not identical across futures. It will 
influence the sensitivity pattern as I find the tilt of the sensitivity pattern generally 
correlates to that of the pattern of trading volume (the correlation coefficient of 
PTM  and PTM  is 0.82). The sensitive pattern tilts more towards 
maturity for energy and agricultural futures and less so for metal futures. 
The difference in how the sensitivity pattern tilts towards maturity across futures will 
affect tests for a linear volatility pattern. This is important to analyse given that most 
previous research makes this linear assumption. As SENSITIVITY rises, peaks, and falls 
over the contract life, return volatility generally follows. Thus, we are more likely to find 
stronger evidence that volatility increases closer to the maturity date if the inverted U-
shape of the sensitivity pattern tilts more towards maturity. As expected, my regression 
results show that while energy and agricultural futures have negative and significant 
TTM coefficients, this is not the case for metals (TTM is insignificant for silver and is 
positive and significant, at the one percent level, for gold). My results resemble that of 
Bessembinder et al. (1996) and Duong and Kalev (2008), who also find weak or 
insignificant results for metals.   
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My findings have important practical implications. Futures return volatility is an essential 
input for forming trading strategies, setting margins and pricing options. Therefore, 
market participants seeking to determine which contract will likely have the highest 
return volatility associated with it will want to take into account the inverted U-shape of 
the sensitivity pattern. This is because the predicted peak of the sensitivity pattern of a 
futures contract can provide a better indication of the highest level of return volatility the 
contract is likely to obtain as opposed to how far the contract is away from maturity. As 
an example, traders who prefer volatility (option buyers, for example) should follow the 
closest-to-peak futures price series instead of the often used closest-to-maturity series to 
maximize the return volatility of their positions.  
To show the value in using closest-to-peak futures, I construct two types of price series. 
The first is constructed from a continuous series of closest-to-peak futures for each 
commodity in my sample, and the second uses closest-to-maturity futures. I then compare 
their average daily return volatility using the in-sample data (from January 1st, 2003 to 
June 30th, 2014) as well as for an out-of-sample period from July 1st, 2014 to December 
31th, 2016. The in-sample results show that the average daily volatility of the closest-to-
peak price series is higher than that of the closest-to-maturity series for five futures. The 
average annualised increase in return volatility is 9.98%. To estimate the economic 
significance, I use the maintenance margin required for trading futures as an estimate of 
the dollar price of volatility because the margin is set based on the level of volatility in 
the futures market. My calculation suggests that such increase in return volatility is worth 
$7,169 for an open position of 1000 contracts. The results for the out-of-sample period 
also show higher volatility for the closest-to-peak series for four futures (2.63% 




3.2. Data and method 
My data consists of twelve commodity futures traded on the four exchanges under the 
CME Group between January 1st, 2003 and June 30th, 2014. The futures are corn and 
wheat (grains), soybean, soybean meal, and soybean oil (oilseeds) traded on the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT); lean hogs and live cattle (livestock) on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME); copper, gold, and silver (metals) on the Commodity Exchange 
(COMEX); and crude oil and natural gas (energy) on the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX). I collect intraday trading data from Thomson Reuter Tick History (TRTH) 
for these contracts. I exclude the early period of each futures contract when market 
activity is low. To do this objectively, I run a Wald test to detect a structural break in the 
open interest of the contract to determine when it starts significantly rising. As an 
example, the September wheat contracts in Figure 1.2 have structural break point dates 
ranging from 118 days to 131 days to maturity. I also follow the literature and drop the 
period when a contract enters its settlement month (Bessembinder et al., 1996; Duong 
and Kalev, 2008). Furthermore, I exclude illiquid contract months when average daily 
trading volume is less than two thousand contracts.11  
I measure the daily sensitivity of futures return volatility to information flows as the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of return volatility to the number of news items that are 
recorded for the day about the underlying commodity: 
SENSITIVITY =
VOLATILITY
NEWS                                              (18) 
                                                             
11 Namely, May futures contracts for lean hogs, October contracts for gold and January contracts for silver. 
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where return volatility is the sum of the squared five-minute realized returns (Andersen 
and Bollerslev, 1998) calculated using intraday data obtained from TRTH. The latest 
quotes available at or prior to each five-minute mark are used to construct the five-minute 
price series. I use mid-point quotes to calculate the five-minute returns to avoid bid-ask 
bounce issues (Roll, 1984). Specifically; 
VOLATILITY =
Bid , + Ask ,
2 −
Bid , + Ask ,
2             (19) 
where  indicates the number of five-minute intervals throughout the trading day . 
I extract the number of daily news items (NEWS) about each commodity from the 
Thompson Reuters News Analytics (TRNA) database. The database contains news 
headlines about commodities and each news item has a reference code indicating the 
commodity or group of commodities that the news is related to. 
I provide in Table 3.1 the summary statistics of the sample, including the type of 
commodity, the exchange that the futures are traded on, their expiration months, and their 
TRNA reference codes.  Table 3.1 also includes the number of observations and number 
of contracts, as well as the average daily sensitivity of return volatility to information 



























Grains Corn CBOT 3,5,7,9,12 GRA 6,271    57 -13.627   78,270 332,715 173 
Grains Wheat CBOT 3,5,7,9,12 GRA 5,597   57 -13.371   30,679 122,109 157 
Oilseeds Soybean CBOT 1,3,5,7,8,9,11 OILS 6,441   79 -13.557   48,489 134,073 132 
Oilseeds Soybean meal CBOT 1,3,5,7,8,9,10,12 MEAL 6,557    90 -13.256   18,296   55,144 120 
Oilseeds Soybean oil CBOT 1,3,5,7,8,9,10,12 OILS 7,184   90 -13.572   21,599   73,222 130 
Livestock Lean hogs CME 2,4,5#,6,7,8,10,12 LIV 5,921   80 -13.758   10,372   52,341 122 
Livestock Live cattle CME 2,4,6,8,10,12 LIV 4,826   68 -14.595   14,838   89,366 133 
Metals Copper COMEX 3,5,7,9,12 MET 3,952   57 -13.817   20,153   55,504 128 
Metals Gold COMEX 2,4,6,8,10#,12 GOL 3,967   57 -13.462   82,367 181,805 128 
Metals Silver COMEX 1#,3,5,7,9,12 GOL 3,889   57 -12.303   25,687   56,088 127 
Energy Crude oil NYMEX Every month CRU 9,111 135 -13.682 105,819 152,988   99 
Energy Natural gas NYMEX Every month NGS 9,093 135 -12.315   44,686   96,163   98 
SENSITIVITY is the sensitivity of futures return volatility to information flows, calculate as SENSITIVITY = , where VOLATILITY is the daily five-minute 
realized volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998), NEWS is the number of daily news about the commodity, identified using the TRNA news code. The daily trading volume 
and open interest are measured in number of contracts. Average contract life is measured in number of days. # indicates illiquid contract months not used in the sample.
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To empirically confirm that trading volume and open interest form an inverted U-shape 
over the life of a futures contract, I regress trading volume and open interest for each 
commodity futures on time-to-maturity and its squared value: 
DV ,      = + TTM , + TTM , + ,                                      (20) 
where the dependent variable DV ,  represents either the natural logarithm of the trading 
volume or open interest for contract  on day . TTM is the square root of the number of 
days to maturity. Contract and year fix effects are included. If trading volume and open 
interest both have an inverted U-shape relationship with time-to-maturity then we should 
find that the coefficient  is positive and  is negative. To test my hypothesis that 
SENSITIVITY is a quadratic function of TTM, I also use Equation (20) with the dependent 
variable, DV , , being the daily SENSITIVITY ,  measure. 
To analyse the inverted U-shape patterns of trading volume, open interest and 
SENSITIVITY  across commodity futures, for each commodity futures I measure the 
distance between the peak of the patterns and maturity, which I call peak-to-maturity 
(PTM). The distance is calculated using the first derivative of Equation (20) and I take 
the square of it to get the PTM measure in days (as TTM is the square root of the number 
of days to maturity): 
PTM =
−






3.3. Empirical results  
 
3.3.1. The time-to-maturity pattern of trading volume and open interest 
To confirm the inverted U-shape time-to-maturity pattern of trading volume and open 
interest, Table 3.2 presents the regression results from Equation (3). Panel A shows the 
results for trading volume and Panel B shows the results for open interest. In both Panels, 
the coefficients for TTM (TTM ) are positive (negative) and are significant, at the one 
percent level, for all futures. The positive coefficients for TTM and negative ones for 
TTM  indicate an inverted U-shape pattern for both trading volume and open interest 
over the life of a futures contract. As the levels of trading volume and open interest 
directly impact SENSITIVITY (Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993), this indicates that 





Table 3.2: Testing the time-to-maturity pattern of trading volume and open interest. 
 Panel A: Trading volume 





































       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 6,271 5,597 6,441 6,557 7,184 5,921 
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.271 0.171 0.294 0.326 0.595 





































       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 4,826 3,952 3,967 3,889 9,111 9,093 
Adjusted R2 0.462 0.085 0.230 0.017 0.562 0.747 
This table presents the results for testing the time-to-maturity pattern of trading volume (Panel A) and open interest (Panel B) 
using the following regressions: VOLUME , = + TTM , + TTM , + ,  and OPEN_INTEREST ,  = + TTM , +
TTM , + , , where VOLUME ,  and OPEN_INTEREST ,  are the natural logarithms of trading volume and open interest for 
contract  on day , respectively. Time-to-maturity (TTM) is measured as the square-root of the number of days to maturity. 




Table 3.2: Testing the time-to-maturity pattern of trading volume and open interest (continued). 
 Panel B: Open interest 





































       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 6,271 5,597 6,441 6,557 7,184 5,921 
Adjusted R2 0.290 0.500 0.130 0.185 0.211 0.011 





































       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 4,826 3,952 3,967 3,889 9,111 9,093 
Adjusted R2 0.825 0.001 0.119 0.151 0.583 0.600 
This table presents the results for testing the time-to-maturity pattern of trading volume (Panel A) and open interest (Panel B) 
using the following regressions: VOLUME , = + TTM , + TTM , + ,  and OPEN_INTEREST ,  = + TTM , +
TTM , + , , where VOLUME ,  and OPEN_INTEREST ,  are the natural logarithms of trading volume and open interest for 
contract  on day , respectively. Time-to-maturity (TTM) is measured as the square-root of the number of days to maturity. 
Contract and year fix effects are included. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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3.3.2. The sensitivity pattern 
To empirically test the main hypothesis that the sensitivity pattern has an inverted U-
shape, Table 3.3 shows univariate analysis of how SENSITIVITY changes over the life of 
a futures contract life by dividing its life into four quartiles. When calculating the 
differences in the mean of SENSITIVITY across the quartiles I find that seven futures 
show evidence that SENSITIVITY follows an inverted U-shape pattern. For corn, wheat, 
soybean, lean hogs, and crude oil futures, the mean of SENSITIVITY increases from the 
fourth to the second quartile, then decreases from the second to the first quartile. The 
differences in mean are significant to at least the ten percent level. For copper and silver 
futures, mean SENSITIVITY increases from the fourth to the third quartile, before 
declining. Soybean meal, soybean oil, and live cattle futures also show a significant 
increase in the mean of SENSITIVITY between the fourth and third quartiles, but the 
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This table presents the univariate test for the change in the sensitivity of return volatility to information 
flows (SENSITIVITY) when the futures contract rolls towards maturity. The sample is divided into four 
quartiles based on the time-to-maturity (TTM) of each contract and the results for the t-test for the 
difference in means of SENSITIVITY between the quartiles are reported. SENSITIVITY is the daily 
sensitivity of futures return volatility to information flows, calculated as SENSITIVITY = , 
where VOLATILITY is the daily five-minute realized volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998) and 
NEWS is the number of daily news about the commodity, identified using the TRNA news code. TTM is 
measured as the square-root of the number of days to maturity. ***, **, and * denote statistical 





In Table 3.4 I test if SENSITIVITY is a quadratic function of time-to-maturity by 
regressing SENSITIVITY on TTM and TTM . The coefficients for TTM are positive and 
significant for all twelve futures. Also, as expected, the coefficients for TTM  are 
negative and significant. The positive coefficients for TTM and the negative coefficients 
for TTM  indicate that the sensitivity pattern has an inverted U-shape for all futures. To 
illustrate the results, Figure 3.1 plots the fitted sensitivity pattern from the regression 
results.  
To ensure the results for the main hypothesis are robust, I also use alternative measures 
for the variables. First, instead of using commodity codes to capture information flows, 
I only count the news items with the name of the commodity (for example, “corn” for 
corn futures) in the headline to limit the news counts to those that are specifically related 
to the commodity. This will exclude peripheral news that the commodity code includes 
that relates to the commodity group. Table 3.5 shows the results hold for all futures, 
except for soybean where the coefficient for TTM is now statistically insignificant. The 
results also hold when I use ten-minute realized volatility or measure TTM as the natural 
logarithm of the number of days to maturity instead of using the square-root. Table 3 and 
4 in the Appendix present the results.  
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Table 3.4: Testing the sensitivity pattern. 
 Corn Wheat Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Lean hogs 




































       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 6,271 5,597 6,441 6,557 7,184 5,921 
Adjusted R2 0.046 0.037 0.071 0.232 0.143 0.078 
 Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil Natural gas 




































       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 4,826 3,952 3,967 3,889 9,111 9,093 
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.117 0.006 0.005 0.106 0.129 
This table presents the results for testing the time-to-maturity pattern of the sensitivity of return volatility to information flows (the 
sensitivity pattern) using the following regression: SENSITIVITY , = + TTM , + TTM , + , , where SENSITIVITY ,  is the 




VOLATILITY ,  is the daily five-minute realized volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998) and NEWS ,  is the number of daily news 
about the commodity, identified using the TRNA news code. Time-to-maturity (TTM) is measured as the square-root of the number 








This figure plots the fitted quadratic sensitivity pattern using the regression results for SENSITIVITY , =
+ TTM , + TTM , + , , where SENSITIVITY ,  is the sensitivity of futures return volatility to 
information flows of contract  on day , calculated as SENSITIVITY , =
,
,
, VOLATILITY ,  
is the daily five-minute realized volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998) and NEWS ,  is the number of 
daily news about the commodity, identified by the headlines containing the name of the commodity. Time-




Table 3.5: Testing the sensitivity pattern using only news headlines containing the name of the commodity. 
 Corn Wheat Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Lean hogs 




































       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 6,271 5,597 6,441 6,557 7,184 5,921 
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.024 0.088 0.002 0.012 0.263 
 Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil Natural gas 




































       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 4,826 3,952 3,967 3,889 9,111 9,093 
Adjusted R2 0.393 0.037 0.023 0.051 0.132 0.256 
This table presents the results for testing the time-to-maturity pattern of the sensitivity of return volatility to information flows (the 
sensitivity pattern) using the following regression: SENSITIVITY , = + TTM , + TTM , + , , where SENSITIVITY ,  is the 




VOLATILITY ,  is the daily five-minute realized volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998) and NEWS ,  is the number of daily news 
about the commodity, identified by the headlines containing the name of the commodity. Time-to-maturity (TTM) is measured as 
the square-root of the number of days to maturity. Contract and year fix effects are included. ***, **, and * denote statistical 




To examine in more detail the inverted U-shape patterns of trading volume, open interest 
and SENSITIVITY for each futures, I proceed to calculate the PTM for each pattern 
using Equation (21). A smaller PTM will indicate that the pattern peaks and starts to 
decline closer to maturity (i.e. the pattern tilts more towards maturity), and vice versa. 
Table 3.6 presents the PTM for the futures in the sample, measured in days and also as a 
percentage of the average contract life (obtained from Table 3.1). Take wheat for 
example, a PTM  of 32% means that trading volume of wheat futures peaks when 
the contract has passed 68% of its life. Open interest peaks after 49% of wheat contract 
life and SENSITIVITY peaks after 80%.  
We can see that in general, open interest peaks around the half-life of the contract. 
PTM   ranges from 32% (crude oil) to 68% (soybean meal) with an average of 
56%. This is consistent with the notion that each futures contract month, at least for the 
agricultural commodity futures, is seasonally tailored to a harvest or production cycle in 
order to facilitate hedging (Working, 1970; Hieronymus, 1978). Open interest rises early 
in the season as stocks build up, then decreases when stocks decline and commodities 





Table 3.6: Analysing the shape of the time-to-maturity pattern of trading volume, open interest and . 
  PTM   PTM    PTM  
  days % of 
contract life 
 days % of contract 
life 
 days % of contract 
life 
Corn  23 13%  95 55%    42 24% 
Wheat  51 32%  80 51%    31 20% 
Soybean  32 24%  79 60%    31 23% 
Soybean meal  23 19%  82 68%    23 19% 
Soybean oil  18 14%  82 63%    27 21% 
Lean hogs  48 39%  60 49%    52 43% 
Live cattle  70 53%  79 59%    67 50% 
Copper  60 47%  79 62%    81 63% 
Gold  48 38%  75 59%  100 78% 
Silver  55 43%  79 62%    86 68% 
Crude oil  13 13%  32 32%    9   9% 
Natural gas   3   3%  46 47%    8   8% 
This table presents the analysis of how the inverted U-shape of the time-to-maturity pattern of trading volume, open interest 
and SENSITIVITY tilts towards maturity for each commodity futures. The measure peak-to-maturity (PTM) is the average 
number of days between the peak of the pattern and maturity, calculated as PTM = , where  and  are the 
coefficients of TTM and TTM  from Table 3.2 (for trading volume and open interest) and Table 3.4 (for SENSITIVITY). The 





The analysis of PTM  indicates that the peak of the pattern of trading volume varies 
across futures. PTM  for energy futures is small (3-13%), followed by that for 
grains and oilseeds futures (13-32%), then for livestock and metal futures (38-53%). This 
means the pattern of trading volume tilts more towards maturity for energy, grains and 
oilseeds futures than for livestock and metals futures. I expect that the inverted U-shape 
of the sensitivity pattern is mainly influenced by the pattern of trading volume. The 
reason is that the pattern of open interest does not vary much across futures (peaks around 
the half-life) and also Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) document a bigger impact on 
return volatility by the level of trading volume than by the level of open interest.  
The results for  PTM  supports my expectation. PTM  is smallest for 
energy futures (8-9%), implying that SENSITIVITY tends to decline only when the 
futures contract is very close to maturity. The peak of the sensitivity pattern of grains and 
oilseeds futures is also quite close to maturity (PTM  being 19%-24%). For 
livestock futures, the peak of the pattern is further from maturity (PTM  being 
43%-50%). For metals futures, I observe that SENSITIVITY peaks early in the contract 
life, even before the futures contract reaches its half-life. PTM  is 63% for 
copper futures, 68% for silver futures, and is highest at 78% for gold futures. To further 
support my point, I also calculate the correlation coefficient of PTM  and 
PTM   and find it to be high at 0.82. The correlation coefficient of PTM  





3.3.4. The tilt of the sensitivity pattern and its impact on the linear test for the volatility 
pattern 
The difference in how the sensitivity pattern tilts towards the maturity date across 
commodity futures could explain the mixed results when testing for a linear volatility 
pattern in previous studies. They assume that the sensitivity pattern monotonically 
increases closer to maturity, and so will the volatility pattern which generally tracks it 
(Rutledge, 1976; Milonas, 1986; Bessembinder et al., 1996; Duong and Kalev, 2008).  
Having shown an inverted U-shape for the sensitivity pattern, I expect that if the pattern 
tilts more (less) towards maturity, we are likely to find stronger (weaker) evidence that 
volatility increases closer to maturity. To test this for my sample, I test for a linear 
volatility pattern by regressing futures return volatility on time-to-maturity: 
VOLATIVITY , = + TTM , + ,                                         (22) 
where VOLATIVITY ,  is the return volatility of futures contract  on day , measured in 
natural logarithm. Year and contract fixed effects are also included. From the analysis of 
the sensitivity pattern above, we should expect the results for the linear volatility pattern 
are strongest for energy futures, then grains, oilseeds, livestock, and metal futures, in that 
order. 
Table 3.7 presents the results. Consistent with my expectation, the results are strong for 
energy, grains, and oilseeds futures. The coefficients for TTM are negative and 
significant at the one percent level for those futures. The results are also significant at the 
five percent level for livestock futures.  I do not find the same results for metal futures. 
The coefficient for TTM is negative and significant at the ten percent level for copper 
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futures, and is insignificant for silver futures. For gold futures, it is positive and 
significant at the one percent level, suggesting that on average gold futures return 
volatility is actually lower when the contract is closer to maturity. In general, the results 
resemble that of Bessembinder et al. (1996) and Duong and Kalev (2008). Bessembinder 
et al. (1996) find weak results for metals and Duong and Kalev’s (2008) results for gold 
futures are similar to my results. The results confirm my conjecture that for commodity 
futures of which the sensitivity pattern tilts more towards maturity, the test for a linear 
volatility pattern is more likely to yield stronger results that return volatility increases 




Table 3.7: Testing the linear volatility pattern. 
 Corn Wheat Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Lean hogs 
























       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 6,271 5,597 6,441 6,557 7,184 5,921 
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.144 0.011 0.081 0.102 0.012 
 Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil Natural gas 
























       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 4,826 3,952 3,967 3,889 9,111 9,093 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.044 0.027 0.073 0.030 0.059 
This table presents the results for testing the linear volatility pattern by regressing return volatility on time-to-maturity using the 
following regression: VOLATIVITY , = + TTM , + , , where  VOLATIVITY ,  is the return volatility of contract  on day , 
measured in natural logarithm. Time-to-maturity (TTM) is measured as the square-root of the number of days to maturity. Year and 




3.3.5. Practical implications 
The results above indicate that, conditional on information flows, futures return volatility 
is more likely to be higher (lower) when the contract is near to (far from) the peak of the 
sensitivity pattern rather than, as previously assumed, near to (far from) the maturity date. 
This suggests market participants should use the distance-to-peak as a better predictor of 
futures return volatility. For example, traders who prefer volatility, such as option buyers, 
are better off choosing the underlying futures contract that is closer to the peak of the 
sensitivity pattern when seeking contracts with the highest level of return volatility. I test 
this by constructing a closest-to-peak futures price series (based on a contract’s distance-
to-peak) and the often used closest-to-maturity series (based on a contract’s distance-to-
maturity). I then compare the average daily return volatility from these two series and 
examine if the closest-to-peak price series does have a higher return volatility. 
I first test the above for an in-sample period from January 1st, 2003 to June 30th, 2014. I 
use the peak of the pattern identified using PTM  in Table 3.6 to construct the 
closest-to-peak price series. For example, PTM  for live cattle is 50%, which 
implies the sensitivity pattern will, on average, peak around the half-life of live cattle 
futures contracts. For a live cattle contract that starts trading 120 days from maturity, the 
peak of the sensitivity pattern will therefore be 60 days from maturity. If that contract is 
trading 70 (or 50) days from maturity, the distance-to-peak is 10 days. I create a 
continuous closest-to-peak price series by always switching to the contract with least 
distance-to-peak. The closest-to-maturity series is composed of contracts that are the 
nearest to maturity. I exclude gold and silver from this analysis as the results for these 
contracts indicate that return volatility does not increase closer to maturity.  
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In Panel A of Table 3.8, I find that the average volatility of the closest-to-peak price 
series is higher than that of the closest-to-maturity price series for five out of ten futures. 
As an example, the average daily volatility for lean hogs increases by 2.38% (from 
(1.42%)  to (1.44%) ) if I use the closest-to-peak series instead of the closest-to-
maturity series. To gauge the economic significance, I use the maintenance margin 
required for trading futures as the measure of the price of futures volatility, obtained from 
the CME Group.12 The maintenance margin is set to cover the possible loss of an open 
position due to price movements. It is set based on the level of volatility in the market 
and is revised frequently when the level of volatility changes. For lean hogs, the average 
maintenance margin during the in-sample period is $963. Thus, a 2.38% increase in 
volatility is worth $22,929 for an open position of 1000 lean hogs contracts ($963 ×
2.38% × 1000). Similar analysis indicates that the average increase in daily return 
volatility across the five futures when using the closet-to-peak series is 0.63% (9.98% 
annually), which leads to an average value of $7,169 for an open position of 1000 
contracts across the futures. For the other five futures, because the peak of the sensitivity 
pattern is relatively close to maturity, the closest-to-peak and the closest-to-maturity 
price series are almost identical.  
I use data from July 1st, 2014 to December 31st, 2016 for the out-of-sample analysis. I 
construct the closest-to-peak price series using the historical PTM  (Table 3.6) 
for each futures. The results for the out-of-sample period, presented in Panel B of Table 
3.8, also indicate that in general, the distance-to-peak is a better predictor of futures return 
volatility than the distance from maturity. The average return volatility of the closest-to-
                                                             
12 When the margins are different between contract months and between hedgers and speculators, I use the 
one for contracts that are closer to maturity and for speculators. Table 6.2 in the Appendix include the 
maintenance margin requirement for the futures in my sample during the period 2003-2016. 
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peak price series is higher than that of the closest-to-maturity price series for four out of 
ten futures. The average annual increase in return volatility when switching between the 
series is 2.53%. Economic analysis similar to the in-sample period suggests this is worth 
$2,935 for an open position of 1000 contracts. The two series are almost identical for the 




Table 3.8: Comparing the volatility of the closest-to-peak and the closest-to-maturity futures price series. 
 Average daily volatility (10-4) 
 Panel A: In-sample period 
(01/01/2003 – 30/06/2014) 











Corn 3.008 3.008 0  3.398 3.398 0 
Wheat 4.976 4.976 0  3.922 3.922 0 
Soybean 2.870 2.867 0.003  2.188 2.187 0.001 
Soybean meal 4.180 4.180 0  3.335 3.335 0 
Soybean oil 2.898 2.897 0.002  2.200 2.200 0 
Lean hogs 2.064 2.016 0.048  2.654 2.652 0.002 
Live cattle 0.870 0.866 0.004  1.092 1.088 0.004 
Copper 3.835 3.829 0.006  1.934 1.931 0.003 
Crude oil 4.437 4.437 0  6.540 6.540 0 
Natural gas 9.330 9.330 0  7.267 7.267 0 
This table presents the comparison of the average daily volatility between the closest-to-peak futures price series and the 
closest-to-maturity series (furthest-to-maturity series for gold and silver) for the in-sample period (01/01/2003 – 
30/06/2014) and out-of-sample period (01/07/2014-31/21/2016). The closest-to-peak price series is constructed using 
contracts that are closest to the peak of the sensitivity pattern obtained from Table 6. The closest-to-maturity series is 





In this chapter, I first empirically confirm that both trading volume and open interest 
follows an inverted U-shape pattern over the life of a futures contract. Open interest peaks 
around the half-life of a contract while the tilt of the pattern of trading volume towards 
maturity varies across futures. I then show, in both my univariate and regression analyses, 
that the sensitivity pattern also has an inverted U-shape and that the tilt of the pattern 
generally correlates to that of the time-to-maturity pattern of trading volume. Finally, I 
show that the test for the linear volatility pattern is significant for agricultural and energy 
futures where the sensitivity pattern peaks close to maturity but not for metal futures, 










CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 





4. CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND POTENTIAL FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
4.1. Contributions and practical implications 
From a broad perspective, this thesis contributes to three important strands of literature. 
First, it contributes to the literature that investigates the Samuelson effect (Rutledge, 
1976; Anderson, 1985; Milonas, 1986; Khoury and Yourougou, 1993; Bessembinder et 
al., 1996; Galloway and Kolb, 1996; Allen and Cruickshank, 2000; and Duong and 
Kalev, 2008) by examining factors that can influence the volatility pattern in that they 
are related to time-to-maturity and also impact return volatility. Namely, I consider 
information asymmetry and the sensitivity of futures prices to information, which is 
driven by the level of futures market activity. In doing so, I also contribute to the two 
bodies of studies that examine information asymmetry and market activity in the futures 
markets and their impact on futures return volatility (Hong, 2000; Shalen, 1993; Daigler 
and Wiley, 1999; and Commodity Exchange Authority, 1960; Powers, 1967; Working, 
1970; Hieronymus, 1978; Leuthold, 1983; Kyle, 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; 
Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993, respectively). 
Specifically, the results of this study provide two explanations for the mixed empirical 
evidence on the volatility pattern observed in previous studies (Rutledge, 1976; 
Anderson, 1985; Milonas, 1986; Khoury and Yourougou, 1993; Bessembinder et al., 
1996; Galloway and Kolb, 1996; Allen and Cruickshank, 2000; and Duong and Kalev, 
2008). In Chapter 2 of this thesis, taking into account the mediation effect information 
has on the volatility pattern suggested by Hong (2000), I show that the speculative effect 
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consistently supports the upward pattern of return volatility over a futures contract’s life. 
The price elasticity effect, on the other hand, is inconsistent. In the majority of cases, it 
is the speculative impact that drives return volatility to rise as futures near expiry. 
Consequently, changes in the level of information asymmetry in the futures market, 
which are not accounted for in previous studies, can have a tangible impact on the 
volatility pattern. This provides the first explanation. In Chapter 3, I directly test the 
sensitivity pattern to take into account any potential clustering in information flows faced 
by previous research when testing the volatility pattern (Anderson and Danthine, 1983). 
I show that the sensitivity pattern has an inverted U-shape, influenced by the inverted U-
shape pattern of the level of market activity (trading volume and open interest) over the 
life of a futures contract. This offers the second explanation, as previous studies assume 
a linear sensitivity pattern that leads to a similar volatility pattern. I show that the test for 
a linear volatility pattern is more likely to yield significant results for commodity futures 
where the sensitivity pattern tilts more towards maturity. 
I also contribute to the literature that investigates information asymmetry in the futures 
market. By empirically supporting Hong’s (2000) hypothesis that information 
asymmetry rises closer to maturity, my results corroborate the underlying argument that 
futures markets are exposed to a greater sensitivity to noise shocks as maturity nears. 
Furthermore, I provide empirical evidence that information asymmetry has a positive 
impact on futures return volatility (see Shalen, 1993; and Daigler and Wiley, 1999). This 
supports the premise that uninformed investors may not recognize their informational 
disadvantage in order to react rationally.  
Finally, this thesis contributes to the literature that investigates futures market activity 
and its impact on return volatility. My results, which imply that the inverted U-shape 
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pattern of market activity influences the inverted U-shape of the sensitivity pattern, 
further substantiate Bessembinder and Seguin’s (1993) finding that futures return 
volatility is directly related to futures trading volume and open interest. Moreover, the 
literature suggests trading volume should track open interest because speculative trading 
should correlate with hedging activity (Commodity Exchange Authority, 1960; Powers, 
1967; Working, 1970; Hieronymus, 1978; Leuthold, 1983). While I find that open 
interest generally peaks around the half-life of a contract, trading volume peaks 
differently across futures. This implies that the relationship between speculative trading 
and hedging is different across futures. 
My findings also have important market implications. As an example, time-to-maturity 
is commonly used as a predictor of return volatility and the closest-to-maturity futures 
price series is expected to have the highest return volatility, if one assumes a monotonic 
sensitivity pattern. An inverted U-shape sensitivity pattern suggests otherwise. It means 
a contract is likely to be more volatile when it is closer to the inverted U-shape peak, so 
distance-to-peak can be a better predictor of return volatility. I show that traders who 
prefer volatility and follow the closest-to-peak futures price series, constructed by rolling 
over contracts that are closest to the peak of the sensitivity pattern, will capture higher 
average return volatility (9.98% in-sample and 2.53% out-of-sample annually). Using the 
maintenance margin for futures trading, which is set based on volatility in the market, as 
an estimate of the price of volatility, I show that such an increase in volatility is worth 
$7,169 in-sample and $2,935 out-of-sample for a position of 1000 contracts.  
My findings can also be beneficial for futures market regulators and futures exchange 
managers. Regulators can devise policies to decrease the information gap between 
informed speculators and uninformed hedgers to reduce the risk of higher volatility in 
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the market. Since information asymmetry is likely to arise due to hedgers being more 
concern about liquidity or having smaller capacity to acquire information, such policies 
could include providing better liquidity to hedgers or developing a more efficient 
information system. Exchange managers can improve the margin setting mechanism to 
account for the inverted U-shape sensitivity pattern. 
 
4.2. Limitations and potential future research 
A few issues arise from this study that could be addressed in future research. First, Hong 
(2000) suggests that the level of information asymmetry within a futures market is related 
to the proportion of informed speculators versus uninformed hedgers in the market. 
Testing this relationship could help us to predict the change in the speculative effect when 
speculators enter or leave the market. However, detailed data on the intraday trading of 
speculators and hedgers, such as the Liquidity Data Bank used to be provided by the 
CME, is not currently available13. More investigation can be conducted should such data 
become available in the future.  
Second, the upward slope of the time-to-maturity pattern of information asymmetry is 
hypothesized by Hong (2000) to be dependent upon the relative persistence of shocks 
from other markets (noise shocks) compared to that of shocks to the fundamental value 
of the underlying commodity. I support this notion by showing that the negative 
relationship between information asymmetry and time-to-maturity is generally weaker 
                                                             
13 The historical Liquidity Data Bank was provided by the CME only until 2011 and is currently not 
available to be acquired. Aside from this, it only reports trading by market participant groups in aggregate 
for each commodity futures market without providing a break down by individual trading contracts, which 
may trade concurrently but have different maturity horizons. 
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during the 2007-2009 financial crisis (see robustness tests in Chapter 2). During this 
period, noise shocks are expected to be more persistent as investors increasingly look to 
hedge their investments using commodity futures. Further research can be conducted to 
precisely quantify the relationship between the slope of the time-to-maturity pattern of 
information asymmetry and the relative persistence of noise shocks. This is relevant 
given that the ongoing financialization of futures markets has led to shocks from other 
markets having more impact in the commodity futures market (Tang and Xiong, 2012; 
Henderson et al., 2015; Adams and Gluck, 2015). 
Third, my analysis of the time-to-maturity pattern of futures market activity implies that 
the relationship between speculative trading and hedging is different across futures. 
Further investigation can be done to determine which characteristics of a commodity 
futures market (for example harvest season or cost of inventory) affect the trading volume 
– open interest relationship, which influences the variation in the sensitivity pattern 
across futures. 
Finally, my findings on the inverted U-shape sensitivity pattern suggest that the volatility 
pattern is likely to also be nonlinear. Since return volatility is an input to other important 



















This thesis investigates two issues that explain the mixed empirical results for the 
Samuelson effect in the literature (Rutledge, 1976; Anderson, 1985; Milonas, 1986; 
Khoury and Yourougou, 1993; Bessembinder et al., 1996; and Duong and Kalev, 2008). 
First, it shows that a significant mediating force on the time-to-maturity pattern of futures 
return volatility is information asymmetry. By departing from the usual assumption that 
information is symmetric across investors and static across the life of the contract, I show 
that an economically significant speculative effect drives the time-to-maturity – return 
volatility relationship. I provide evidence supporting Hong’s (2000) assertion that 
information asymmetry is negatively related to the life of a futures contract. My empirical 
results also show this leads to a positive, as opposed to his prediction of a negative 
relationship, with return volatility. This could be explained by the inability of uninformed 
hedgers to learn about their informational disadvantage.  
Second, this study is the first to empirically test the sensitivity pattern of futures 
contracts. I argue that the sensitivity pattern should have an inverted U-shape relationship 
with time-to-maturity. The reason is that the level of market activity (trading volume and 
open interest), which influences sensitivity (Kyle, 1983; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; 
and Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993), follows an inverted U-shape pattern over the life 
of a futures contract (Commodity Exchange Authority, 1960; Powers, 1967; Working, 
1970; Leuthold, 1983). I document an inverted U-shape sensitivity pattern instead of the 
linear one assumed in previous studies and show that tests for a linear return volatility 
relationship will only materialise for those futures where the sensitivity pattern tilts 
toward the maturity date of the contract.  
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My findings are economically significant. First, I find that for every ten days that a 
futures contract moves closer to maturity, information asymmetry increases, on average, 
by 3.64%. This is equivalent to 0.00258 cents on the bid-ask spread and based on daily 
average trading volumes in the futures markets implies a rise of $9,546 in daily trading 
costs. Second, the speculative effect raises daily realized volatility by an average of 
2.22% for every ten trading days. Finally, I show that traders who prefer volatility and 
follow the closest-to-peak futures price series, constructed of contracts that are closest to 
the peak of the sensitivity pattern, will capture higher average return volatility (9.98% 
in-sample and 2.53% out-of-sample, annually), which is worth $7,169 and $2,935 for a 
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Contract unit Price quotation Product 
code 
Settlement method 
Grains Corn CBOT 3,5,7,9,12 5,000 bushels (~ 127 metric tons) Cents per bushel C Deliverable 
        
Grains Wheat CBOT 3,5,7,9,12 5,000 bushels (~ 136 metric tons) Cents per bushel W Deliverable 
        
Oilseeds Soybean CBOT 1,3,5,7,8,9,11 5,000 bushels (~ 136 metric tons) Cents per bushel S Deliverable 
        
Oilseeds Soybean meal CBOT 1,3,5,7,8,9,10,12 100 short tons (~ 91 metric tons) Cents per short ton SM Deliverable 
        
Oilseeds Soybean oil CBOT 1,3,5,7,8,9,10,12 60,000 pounds (~ 27 metric tons) Cents per pound BO Deliverable 
        
Livestock Feeder cattle CME 1,3,4,5,8,9,10,11 50,000 pounds (~ 23 metric tons) Cents per pound GF Financially settled 
        
Livestock Lean hogs CME 2,4,5,6,7,8,10,12 40,000 pounds (~ 18 metric tons) Cents per pound LH Financially settled 
        
Livestock Live cattle CME 2,4,6,8,10,12 40,000 pounds (~ 18 metric tons) Cents per pound LE Deliverable 
        
Metals Copper COMEX 3,5,7,9,12 25,000 pounds Dollars and cents per pound HG Deliverable 
        
Metals Gold COMEX 2,4,6,8,10,12 100 troy ounces Dollars and cents per troy ounce GC Deliverable 
        
Metals Silver COMEX 1,3,5,7,9,12 5,000 troy ounces Dollars and cents per troy ounce SI Deliverable 
        
Energy Crude oil NYMEX Every month 1,000 barrels Dollars and cents per barrel CL Deliverable 
        
Energy Natural gas NYMEX Every month 10,000 million British thermal 
units (mmBtu) 
Dollars and cents per mmBtu NG Deliverable 




Appendix Table 2: Historical maintenance margin during the period 2003-2016. 

















11/2003 $400 11/2003 $650 11/2003 $1200 11/2003 $700 
04/2004 $450 01/2004 $725 01/2004 $1500 01/2004 $900 
04/2004 $600 03/2004 $800 04/2004 $1600 02/2004 $1000 
06/2004 $625 04/2004 $875 04/2004 $1900 04/2004 $1100 
07/2004 $575 07/2004 $675 05/2004 $2300 04/2004 $1300 
09/2004 $400 09/2004 $500 04/2004 $1800 05/2004 $1600 
09/2004 $350 12/2004 $450 07/2004 $1700 06/2004 $1800 
10/2004 $300 02/2005 $550 09/2004 $1900 06/2004 $1400 
11/2004 $250 03/2005 $600 09/2004 $1450 07/2004 $1250 
01/2005 $325 04/2005 $700 10/2004 $1350 09/2004 $900 
03/2005 $325 09/2005 $375 11/2004 $1200 10/2004 $800 
07/2005 $500 02/2006 $450 12/2004 $900 11/2004 $700 
08/2005 $600 05/2006 $550 02/2005 $1100 11/2004 $550 
09/2005 $375 05/2006 $650 03/2005 $1350 02/2005 $750 
11/2005 $300 06/2006 $950 07/2005 $1700 03/2005 $825 
12/2005 $250 07/2006 $700 08/2005 $1850 07/2005 $1100 
04/2006 $350 09/2006 $800 09/2005 $800 09/2005 $525 
05/2006 $400 10/2006 $1000 12/2005 $750 12/2005 $600 
08/2006 $450 10/2006 $1250 01/2006 $850 01/2006 $750 
10/2006 $500 12/2006 $1150 05/2006 $750 05/2006 $600 
10/2006 $650 06/2007 $1250 12/2006 $800 08/2006 $500 
11/2006 $850 08/2007 $1400 01/2007 $1000 11/2006 $625 
12/2006 $750 09/2007 $1500 06/2007 $900 01/2007 $800 
01/2007 $900 12/2007 $2000 07/2007 $1350 06/2007 $700 
01/2007 $1000 01/2009 $2500 07/2007 $1800 07/2007 $950 
09/2007 $800 05/2009 $2000 09/2007 $2000 07/2007 $1350 
01/2009 $1500 11/2009 $1750 01/2009 $3500 01/2009 $2000 
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05/2009 $1200 01/2010 $1500 05/2009 $3000 11/2009 $1500 
11/2009 $1100 04/2010 $1200 11/2009 $2750 04/2010 $1200 
12/2009 $1000 07/2010 $1000 06/2010 $2250 06/2010 $1000 
05/2010 $850 08/2010 $2500 10/2010 $2000 08/2010 $1100 
07/2010 $950 03/2011 $3000 10/2010 $2500 10/2010 $1250 
10/2010 $1100 09/2011 $2250 11/2010 $2750 10/2010 $1750 
10/2010 $1500 07/2012 $2750 11/2010 $3250 11/2010 $2000 
04/2011 $1750 01/2013 $2400 01/2011 $3500 06/2011 $1750 
06/2012 $2000 08/2013 $2000 06/2011 $3250 08/2011 $1500 
08/2013 $1500 11/2013 $1650 08/2011 $2750 09/2011 $1250 
08/2013 $1750 02/2014 $1400 09/2011 $2500 05/2012 $1450 
05/2014 $1500 05/2014 $1500 07/2012 $3000 06/2012 $1600 
09/2014 $1250 10/2014 $1300 07/2012 $3750 07/2012 $2000 
11/2014 $1000 06/2015 $1500 01/2013 $3400 08/2013 $2250 
07/2015 $1250 07/2015 $1750 08/2013 $3000 09/2013 $2000 
12/2015 $1000 01/2016 $1500 08/2013 $3500 10/2013 $2250 
03/2016 $900 03/2016 $1200 11/2013 $2900 02/2014 $2000 
04/2016 $1050 05/2016 $1400 03/2014 $2500 05/2014 $1800 
06/2016 $1250 08/2016 $1200 05/2014 $3000 07/2014 $2000 
07/2016 $1400 10/2016 $1000 09/2014 $2500 09/2014 $1500 
09/2016 $1150   01/2015 $2250 10/2014 $2000 
10/2016 $1050   03/2015 $2000 11/2014 $2500 
10/2016 $900   07/2015 $2300 02/2015 $2100 
    09/2015 $2600 05/2015 $1900 
    01/2016 $2100 07/2015 $2200 
    03/2016 $1800 01/2016 $1800 
    03/2016 $1500 02/2016 $1500 
    04/2016 $1750 03/2016 $1200 
    05/2016 $2000 04/2016 $1450 
    05/2016 $2300 04/2016 $1600 
    06/2016 $2600 05/2016 $2000 
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    07/2016 $2900 06/2016 $2250 
    07/2016 $3100 10/2016 $1800 
    09/2016 $2700   
    10/2016 $2400   

















11/2003 $550 01/2004 $800 01/2003 $550 01/2009 $5750 
03/2004 $650 07/2006 $900 03/2003 $650 08/2009 $4500 
03/2004 $850 01/2007 $800 10/2003 $700 12/2009 $3500 
06/2004 $850 04/2007 $700 10/2003 $900 04/2010 $4250 
07/2004 $750 07/2007 $600 10/2003 $1000 06/2010 $5000 
09/2004 $650 09/2007 $900 10/2003 $1200 09/2010 $4000 
12/2004 $475 01/2009 $1000 10/2003 $1500 12/2010 $4750 
02/2005 $600 02/2009 $800 10/2003 $2000 01/2011 $4250 
03/2005 $725 03/2009 $900 10/2003 $1200 09/2011 $5000 
07/2005 $800 05/2009 $1050 12/2003 $1600 10/2011 $5750 
09/2005 $500 07/2010 $950 12/2003 $2000 02/2012 $5000 
12/2005 $450 10/2010 $1100 02/2004 $1200 04/2012 $4000 
01/2006 $500 02/2011 $1250 03/2004 $1000 11/2012 $3500 
05/2006 $400 05/2012 $1050 06/2004 $1200 02/2013 $3100 
11/2006 $450 08/2012 $1250 09/2004 $1050 05/2013 $3700 
07/2007 $600 11/2012 $1050 04/2005 $900 06/2013 $4000 
09/2007 $700 06/2013 $1250 04/2005 $800 09/2013 $3500 
01/2009 $1500 08/2013 $1000 10/2005 $700 11/2013 $3000 
10/2009 $1000 03/2014 $1200 07/2006 $850 07/2014 $2700 
03/2010 $800   01/2007 $700 08/2014 $2600 
05/2010 $700   09/2007 $800 12/2014 $2900 
10/2010 $1100   10/2008 $1100 01/2015 $3400 
11/2010 $1300   10/2008 $1200 04/2015 $3100 
11/2010 $1500     02/2016 $2850 
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06/2011 $1250     04/2016 $2600 
09/2011 $1000     05/2016 $2300 
04/2012 $900     10/2016 $1900 
06/2012 $1000     11/2016 $2300 
07/2012 $1250     11/2016 $2750 
08/2013 $1000       
10/2013 $1500       
02/2014 $1350       
05/2014 $1150       
09/2014 $700       
12/2014 $800       
08/2015 $950       
02/2016 $800       
04/2016 $750       
10/2016 $650       
11/2016 $715       
12/2016 $825       

















01/2009 $4302 01/2009 $6400 01/2009 $6750 01/2009 $6500 
02/2009 $3999 02/2009 $6000 01/2009 $6000 02/2009 $5750 
09/2009 $3333 08/2009 $4000 02/2009 $5250 03/2009 $5000 
01/2010 $4002 12/2009 $4500 04/2009 $5750 09/2009 $4500 
03/2010 $4998 02/2010 $5000 09/2009 $5250 10/2009 $5000 
06/2010 $4251 05/2010 $4250 09/2009 $4500 04/2010 $4500 
11/2010 $4500 07/2010 $5000 11/2009 $4000 07/2010 $4000 
02/2011 $5001 11/2010 $7250 04/2010 $3750 01/2011 $3500 
06/2011 $4500 01/2011 $7750 02/2011 $4500 04/2011 $3000 
08/2011 $5500 02/2011 $8250 03/2011 $5000 08/2011 $2750 
08/2011 $7000 03/2011 $8700 05/2011 $6250 10/2011 $2500 
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09/2011 $8500 04/2011 $9500 09/2011 $6000 01/2012 $2100 
02/2012 $7500 04/2011 $10750 12/2011 $5600 07/2012 $2300 
05/2012 $6750 05/2011 $14000 02/2012 $5100 08/2012 $2500 
01/2013 $6000 05/2011 $16000 06/2012 $4600 11/2012 $2250 
03/2013 $5400 09/2011 $18500 07/2012 $5100 02/2013 $2100 
04/2013 $6400 02/2012 $16000 01/2013 $4500 05/2013 $2350 
06/2013 $8000 04/2012 $14000 04/2013 $4100 09/2013 $2100 
11/2013 $7250 08/2012 $12500 11/2013 $3700 01/2014 $2300 
04/2014 $6500 12/2012 $11000 11/2013 $3400 01/2014 $4500 
05/2014 $6000 02/2013 $9500 03/2014 $3100 02/2014 $5000 
07/2014 $5400 04/2013 $11250 04/2014 $2900 02/2014 $5500 
09/2014 $4600 11/2013 $10000 08/2014 $2700 02/2014 $4750 
10/2014 $4000 04/2014 $9000 10/2014 $3400 03/2014 $4000 
05/2015 $3750 05/2014 $8250 11/2014 $3700 03/2017 $3000 
02/2016 $4250 07/2014 $7500 12/2014 $3850 04/2014 $2850 
03/2016 $4500 08/2014 $6500 12/2014 $4450 06/2014 $2550 
06/2016 $5500 10/2014 $5500 02/2015 $4900 06/2014 $2800 
07/2016 $6000 12/2014 $6500 05/2015 $4250 10/2014 $2710 
08/2016 $5400 02/2015 $7700 07/2015 $4600 11/2014 $3100 
11/2016 $6000 06/2015 $7000 12/2015 $4000 11/2014 $3650 
  08/2015 $6000 02/2016 $3500 12/2014 $4050 
  01/2016 $5200 04/2016 $3400 02/2015 $3200 
  04/2016 $4800 08/2016 $3200 03/2015 $2500 
  07/2016 $5250 09/2016 $2900 04/2015 $2000 
  11/2016 $5800 12/2016 $3200 11/2015 $2250 
  12/2016 $6500   02/2016 $1900 
      03/2016 $1800 
      04/2016 $1650 
      07/2016 $1800 
      07/2016 $2050 
      08/2016 $2200 
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      08/2016 $2350 
      12/2016 $2850 
      12/2016 $3100 
This table presents the historical maintenance margin requirement for speculators to trade the closest to maturity contracts announced by the CME Group during the period 







Appendix Table 3: Testing the sensitivity pattern using ten-minute realized volatility. 
 Corn Wheat Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Lean hogs 




































       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 6,271 5,597 6,441 6,557 7,184 5,921 
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.099 0.152 0.296 0.190 0.123 
 Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil Natural gas 




































       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 4,826 3,952 3,967 3,889 9,111 9,093 
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.268 0.020 0.004 0.148 0.127 
This table presents the results for testing the time-to-maturity pattern of the sensitivity of return volatility to information flows (the 
sensitivity pattern) using the following regression: SENSITIVITY , = + TTM , + TTM , + , , where SENSITIVITY ,  is the 




VOLATILITY ,  is the daily ten-minute realized volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998) and NEWS ,  is the number of daily news 
about the commodity, identified by the headlines containing the name of the commodity. Time-to-maturity (TTM) is measured as 
the square-root of the number of days to maturity. Contract and year fix effects are included. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Appendix Table 4: Testing the sensitivity pattern using the natural logarithm of the number of days to maturity as 
time-to-maturity. 
 Corn Wheat Soybean Soybean meal Soybean oil Lean hogs 




































       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 6,271 5,597 6,441 6,557 7,184 5,921 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.016 0.079 0.200 0.134 0.095 
 Live cattle Copper Gold Silver Crude oil Natural gas 




































       
Fixed effects Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year Contract, Year 
Observations 4,826 3,952 3,967 3,889 9,111 9,093 
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.289 0.009 0.006 0.100 0.112 
This table presents the results for testing the time-to-maturity pattern of the sensitivity of return volatility to information 
flows (the sensitivity pattern) using the following regression: SENSITIVITY , = + TTM , + TTM , + , , where 




, VOLATILITY ,  is the daily five-minute realized volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 
1998) and NEWS ,  is the number of daily news about the commodity, identified by the headlines containing the name of 
the commodity. Time-to-maturity (TTM) is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of days to maturity. Contract 
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